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TOWARDS A COMMON LAW ORIGINALISM 
BERNADETTE MEYLER* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Originalists’ emphasis upon William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England tends to suggest that the 
common law of the Founding era consisted in a set of determinate 
rules that can be mined for the purposes of constitutional 
interpretation.  This Article argues instead that disparate strands of 
the common law, some emanating from the colonies and others 
from England, some more archaic and others more innovative, co-
existed at the time of the Founding.  Furthermore, jurists and 
politicians of the Founding generation were not unaware that the 
common law constituted a disunified field; indeed, the 
jurisprudence of the common law suggested a conception of its 
identity as much more flexible and susceptible to change than 
originalists posit.    
The alternative that this Article proposes—“common law 
originalism”—treats the strands of eighteenth-century common law 
not as providing determinate answers that fix the meaning of 
particular constitutional clauses but instead as supplying the terms 
of a debate about certain concepts, framing questions for judges 
but refusing to settle them definitively.  It likewise suggests that 
the interpretation of common law phrases should be responsive to 
certain alterations in external conditions, rather than static and 
inflexible.  Situated between living constitutionalism and 
originalism as currently practiced, common law originalism 
attempts to square fidelity to the Founding era with fidelity to its 
common law jurisprudence—a jurisprudence that retained 
continuity yet emphasized flexibility and was inclusive enough to 
hold disparate legal conceptions in its embrace.   
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  I am grateful for extremely 
valuable comments and suggestions to Greg Alexander, Kevin Clermont, Dan 
Hulsebosch, Doug Kysar, Richard Primus, Steve Shiffrin, Simon Stern, and the 
participants in the NYU Legal History Colloquium, the May Gathering at the 
University of Virginia and the Cornell Law and Humanities Colloquium.  I am 
also indebted to the invaluable research assistance of Jessica Felker.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
If constitutional originalism is, as some have claimed, dead, 
it rules us from the grave.1  While the proponents of originalism 
are far from monolithic in their approach, critics, and, in particular, 
those arguing for an unwritten constitution or an interpretation of 
the constitution as a living document, have hardly been successful 
in persuading originalists that their vantage point, or cluster of 
vantage points, is flawed.2  This Article claims that a central 
feature of originalist approaches—the resort to a Blackstonian 
vision of eighteenth-century common law as a backdrop to 
constitutional interpretation3—faces several significant problems.  
These may not, however, prove fatal to originalism, but rather 
encourage its metamorphosis into a more dynamic creature, one 
with appeal both to originalists and living constitutionalists.4    
In a number of constitutional contexts, originalists urge that 
particular terms and phrases—including “law of nations,” “habeas 
corpus,” “privileges and immunities,” “otherwise re-examined,” 
and “assistance of counsel”—should be interpreted in light of their 
connotations under the common law.5  They also contend that the 
                                                 
1 For the suggestion that “Judge Alito seemed to endorse originalism” during his 
confirmation hearing, see Jeffrey Rosen, The Nation: Benchmark, 4:1 (Jan. 15, 
2006).  For the potential demise of textualist originalism, see generally Jonathan 
T. Molot, Exchange: The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COL. L. REV. 1 
(2006). 
2 For arguments against originalism by advocates of an unwritten or living 
constitution, see Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 
CHI. KENT L. REV. 211 (1988); Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: 
Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 
(1978); Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1974); 
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 885 (1985).  Randy Barnett has recently claimed Powell’s work for the 
side of originalism—or at least his own brand of “original meaning 
originalism”—itself.  See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 113 (2004) (“the same historical 
evidence offered by Powell in opposition to original intent supports original 
meaning based on ‘the public meaning or intent of a state paper’”). 
3 See infra Part I. 
4 See infra Part IV. 
5 See U.S. CONST. art. I, sect. 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power “to define 
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences 
against the Law of Nations”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 739-51 
(Scalia, J. concurring) (interpreting the “law of nations” in the Alien Tort Statute 
as “part of the so-called general common law” at the time of the Founding); U.S. 
CONST. art. I, sect. 9, cl. 2; INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 336-45 (2001) (Scalia, 
J. dissenting) (examining the common law conception of habeas corpus to give 
content to the Suspension Clause); U.S. CONST. art. IV, sect. 2, cl. 1 (“The 
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to the Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States”); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 524 (Thomas, J. 
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common law provides a key to understanding the meaning of 
certain constitutional provisions, such as the Eleventh Amendment, 
beyond their literal language.6  Originalists’ invocations of the 
                                                                                                             
dissenting) (“The colonists’ repeated assertions that they maintained the rights, 
privileges, and immunities of persons ‘born within the realm of England’ and 
‘natural born’ persons suggests that, at the time of the founding, the terms 
‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ (and their counterparts) were understood to refer 
to those fundamental rights and liberties specifically enjoyed by English citizens 
and, more broadly, by all persons.”); U.S. CONST. amend. 6 (“In all criminal 
trials, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defence.”); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2566-68 
(Alito, J. dissenting) (interpreting the Assistance of Counsel Clause against the 
backdrop of the common law rule limiting such assistance in felony cases); U.S. 
CONST. amend. 7 (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no 
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law.”); Gasperini v. Center for 
the Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 450-54 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (maintaining that 
the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment should be interpreted in 
light of common law practice regarding judges sitting in an appellate capacity). 
6 The literal language of the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits by a State’s 
citizens against that State, but the Amendment has generally been interpreted as 
doing so since Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  See U.S. CONST. amend. 
11 (“The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”).  As John Manning has explained, the Supreme Court’s understanding of 
the Eleventh Amendment since Hans v. Lousiana, as instantiated most recently 
and dramatically by the Rehnquist Court’s decisions on the subject, has been 
strongly purposivist, rather than adhering to the precise specifications of the 
constitutional text.  See John Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the 
Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1666-71 (2004).  
In its purposivism, the Rehnquist Court insisted that the Eleventh Amendment 
was designed simply to restore the Constitution’s original protection of state 
sovereign immunity, or the “presupposition” that “it is inherent in the nature of 
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent,” 
which the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 
419 (1793), had called into question.  See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 54, 69-70 (1996).  Although sometimes framing this presupposition 
about sovereignty as part of the "jurisprudence [of] all civilized nations,” the 
majority's analyses as well as the dissenters' critiques in these cases demonstrate 
that it derived in large part from the common law.  See Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 733 (1999) (observing that, “Although the sovereign immunity of the 
States derives at least in part from the common-law tradition, the structure and 
history of the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by 
constitutional design”); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 131-42 (Souter, J.. 
dissenting) (arguing that Hans and the Seminole Tribe majority rest their views 
about sovereign immunity upon the common law and that such reliance is 
inapposite); but cf. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69 (claiming that the decision in 
Hans, and, by extrapolation, that in Seminole Tribe itself, “found its      
roots not solely in the common law of England, but in the much more            
fundamental ‘jurisprudence in all civilized nations.’”). Indeed, dissenting in one 
sovereign immunity case, Justice Breyer even compared the Rehnquist Court’s 
version of the doctrine to the “thought of [seventeenth-century King] James I.”  
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common law posit a fixed, stable, and unified eighteenth-century 
content, largely encapsulated in William Blackstone’s 1765-69 
Commentaries on the Laws of England.7   
Originalists resort to the common law in part to constrain 
judges’ interpretive discretion.8  Under this rationale, the accuracy 
of their historical account matters little; the discovery of a 
definitive, externally supplied answer to a constitutional question 
constitutes the crucial component of the method.  Yet this kind of 
formalism cannot provide a complete justification for an originalist 
stance; taken on its own, such reasoning would support reference 
to Robinson Crusoe as much as to Blackstone.9  Many other—and, 
in today’s parlance, many more democratically legitimate—
limitations could be imposed upon judges’ reasoning.  Judges 
could, for example, be forced to look in every case to 
congressional statutes or state legislation and adopt the majority 
approach.10   
                                                                                                             
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666, 704 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  In the sovereign immunity 
context, originalist invocation of the common law has thus not relied on the 
common law meaning of particular terms, but has instead appealed to the 
structure of a particular political concept within the context of the common law.  
See generally Jed Rubenfeld, The New Unwritten Constitution, 2001 DUKE L.J. 
289 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s recent Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence represents a new recourse to unwritten law).   
7 See infra Part I.  
8 See ANTONIN SCALIA, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 9-12 (Amy 
Gutman ed., 1997) (arguing that judges apply the common law method outside 
of its appropriate province, in the context of interpreting statutes and the 
Constitution, that this exercise constitutes judicial law-making, and that such 
law-making outside of the legislative branch is undemocratic).   
9 The narrator of Willkie Collins’ novel The Moonstone, butler Gabriel 
Betteridge, has recourse to random pages of Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe in 
order to resolve various quandaries.  See WILLKIE COLLINS, THE MOONSTONE 
13 (2001) (1871) (“When my spirits are bad—Robinson Crusoe.  When I want 
advice—Robinson Crusoe. . . .  I have worn out six stout Robinson Crusoes with 
hard work in my service.”).  In the attempt to seek such solutions, Betteridge 
simply opens Robinson Crusoe to a random page, the lessons of which he then 
applies to the current situation.  Id. at 11, 179.   
10 Keith Whittington and Jed Rubenfeld both make similar points.  See KEITH 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 39 (1999) (observing that the aim of 
“prevent[ing] judges from engaging in willful or arbitrary behavior” is 
insufficient to justify recourse to originalism because “the adoption of any 
interpretive method constrains judges from engaging in arbitrary or willful 
behavior”); Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 1995 YALE L.J. 
1119, 1135-36 (positing a situation “in which current popular will (accepting 
arguendo this figure of speech) is judicially known or knowable-through polls, 
countrywide legislation, and so on-as well as, if not better than, the will of the 
‘Framers,’ particularly given the notorious difficulties in defining that term.”).   
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Some additional reason must be supplied for selecting the 
common law of the eighteenth century as a relevant constraint 
upon constitutional interpretation.11  The most plausible consists in 
the idea that the clauses of the Constitution possess meaning, and 
that that meaning derives from the understanding of the 
constitutional text at the moment of ratification.  To the extent that 
originalists’ recourse to a Blackstonian account of the common law 
is premised upon this assumption as well as the formalist 
argument, their approach is susceptible to historical critique. 
Several problems plague originalists’ approach to the 
common law as it stood at the time of the Founding.  The manner 
in which originalists frame their appeal to the common law itself 
misrepresents the object of inquiry.  They envision the common 
law as a set of doctrines that can be mined in constitutionally 
relevant ways.  What Justice Scalia, for example, finds to praise in 
the common law tradition is a body of rules presumed to be clear 
in the eighteenth century, whereas what he disparages consists in a 
particular method of approach, that of the common law judge.12  
Yet it is not entirely possible to disaggregate these aspects of the 
common law.  In order to understand the nature and limits of the 
“rules” attributable to the eighteenth-century American common 
law, it is essential to examine the internal orderings of the concept 
of common law at the time.  Defining the scope of the common 
law is exceedingly difficult; indeed, its parameters often emerge 
only out of shifting and often permeable sets of contrasts—
between common and statutory law; between common and civil 
law; between common law and equity; and between common and 
local custom.  At the same time, certain eighteenth-century usages 
of the phrase “common law” occur frequently enough to warrant 
describing it as comprehending at least four general aspects.  The 
common law implied a particular arrangement of institutional 
authority—including a distribution of power between judge and 
                                                                                                             
In the substantive due process context, some Justices already survey the 
states in evaluating whether history and tradition support a particular right or a 
restriction on that alleged right.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 
(2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-11 (1997).   
11 For the point that appeal to the Founders’ intentions is not self-authorizing, 
and, hence, originalism cannot simply refrain from justifying itself by invoking 
the democratic legitimacy conferred by a prior moment, that of the Founding, 
see WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 49, 218; Rubenfeld, supra note 10, at 1127-
30, 1134-39. 
12 See SCALIA, supra note 8, at 10 (referring to the common law of the Founding 
generation as “a preexisting body of rules”); id. at 6-9 (criticizing what he 
designates as the common law approach, consisting in the attempt to discern the 
best legal rule and then apply it to the particular case by sedulously 
distinguishing other potentially controlling precedents).   
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jury and between common law courts and those of equity.13  It also 
denoted a certain set of procedures and their relation to a number 
of what we would designate substantive principles.14  Furthermore, 
it described a particular—although not our—relation to judicial 
precedent.  Finally, it provided a justification for legal authority in 
the form of appeals to the “ancient constitution.”15  To the extent 
that originalists’ invocation of eighteenth-century common law 
represents an attempt to discern the meaning of particular 
provisions to the audience contemporaneous with the 
Constitution’s ratification, ignoring the larger framework within 
which the particular doctrines of the common law functioned 
imperils the success of the enterprise.  
Even when viewed with the originalist’s spotlight on 
specific doctrines, the common law was far from a unified field at 
the time of the Founding, nor was it so conceived, as both the 
writings of the Founders themselves and contemporaneous legal 
commentary demonstrate.16  Rather, the common law of the 
Founding era partook of a number of disparate strands, with the 
colonies, and subsequently the several states, diverging from the 
British heritage.17  This situation resulted, in part, from the 
principle that only such parts of the common law were adopted as 
suited the condition of the colonies, but it also derived from the 
temporal disjunction between the moment of direct importation of 
the common law into the colonies at the time of their settlement 
and Blackstone’s systematic formulation of the British common 
law in the middle of the eighteenth century.18  As a consequence, a 
single common law answer to a constitutional question often 
remains unavailable; instead, several distinct positions may present 
themselves.   
                                                 
13 Recent cases reviewing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have 
acknowledged the distinctive contours of one of those institutions—the jury—
under the common law.  See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); 
United States v. Fanfan, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 
2531 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
14 See Daniel Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: The ‘Common Law’ in the Age of 
Revolution (unpublished manuscript) (describing the transformation of the 
common law from an eighteenth-century context in which it “offer[ed] a limited 
number of causes of action, embodied in formulaic writs, that gave specific 
remedies for specific injuries” to a nineteenth-century “system of rights in which 
remedies followed automatically upon proof of infringement of those rights”); 
Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: Navigability’ and the Transformation of the 
Common Law in the Nineteenth Cenutry, Cardozo L. Rev. 23 (2002).   
15 For a discussion of the impact and importance of the English notion of the 
“ancient constitution” upon eighteenth-century American law and culture, see 
generally JOHN REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LIBERTY (2005). 
16 See infra Part II.   
17 See infra notes 71-134 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 71-134 and accompanying text. 
 7 
Returning to the broader view of eighteenth-century 
common law, the jurisprudence of the common law suggested a 
conception of its identity as much more flexible and susceptible to 
change than originalists posit.19  A certain self-consciousness, 
furthermore, characterized common law jurisprudence of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a self-consciousness that 
undermines the view—expressed by Justice Scalia, among 
others—that we became aware judges made rather than discovered 
law only with the legal realists.20  Although insisting that the 
common law stemmed from a time beyond memory, jurists like Sir 
Edward Coke and Sir Matthew Hale, whose work was received in 
America and lauded by members of the Founding era, implicitly 
developed the theory that the common law was open to alteration 
through suggesting that, in law, history could be strategically 
deployed rather than only factually invoked.21   
There are three reasons why the place of history in these 
early jurisprudences of the common law should inform an 
originalist interpretation of the Constitution.  The first, which has 
been most eloquently articulated by Tom Grey, and does not 
appeal to most originalists, insists that the original understanding 
of a canonical text, like that of the Constitution, comprehends 
particular “expectations about the future process of interpretation 
itself.”22  In this case, it would include the common law’s self-
understanding of the dynamics of historical co-optation.  A second 
rationale, which may be more palatable to the originalist, suggests 
that the jurisprudential context of the Constitution’s invocation of 
the common law represents a necessary backdrop to an attempt at 
discerning the original understanding of the Constitution’s 
common law terms.  Third, the “pre-post-realism” of early 
common law jurisprudence, and the extent to which the “objective” 
legal use of history that originalists seek to implement was more 
rhetoric than reality even in the jurisprudence of eighteenth-
century common lawyers, might force originalists to recharacterize 
the nature of their project.  
                                                 
19 See infra Part III.   
20 Justice Scalia also contrasts what he views as the eighteenth-century common 
law method with the post-realist mode.  Id. at 10.  As argued below, this 
distinction may not entirely hold up; early common lawyers were hardly less 
disingenuous than their contemporary counterparts.  See infra Part III. 
21 See infra Part III.  
22 Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI. KENT L. 
REV. 211, 232 (1988).  Grey contends that “[T]he politicians who frame a 
constitution intend it ‘to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be 
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.’  Writers projecting words into an 
indefinite future in this way foresee and expect that they will be read, and 
reasonably read, in ways that fit neither the words’ plain meaning at the moment 
of utterance, nor the writers’ own immediate concrete intentions.”  Id.  See also 
Powell, supra note 2. 
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In light of these critiques, this Article outlines an 
alternative, “common law originalism,” and, through several 
examples from the Seventh Amendment, sketches its differences 
from, on the one hand, originalism as currently practiced, and, on 
the other, living constitutionalism.23  Common law originalism 
regards the strands of eighteenth-century common law not as 
providing determinate answers that fix the meaning of particular 
constitutional clauses but instead as supplying the terms of a 
debate about certain concepts, framing questions for judges but 
refusing to settle them definitively.  It suggests further that the 
interpretation of common law phrases should be responsive to 
certain alterations in external conditions, rather than static and 
inflexible.  This alternative originalism thus attends primarily to 
the questions presented by juxtaposing disparate versions of 
eighteenth-century common law and to the potential for 
reconciling assertions of historicity with the possibility of change.  
Taking Justice Scalia’s theories and their implementation 
as its primary point of reference,24 Part I details the originalist 
approach to the common law, one grounded in a fundamental 
paradox—rejection of the jurisprudence of the common law 
combined with endorsement of Blackstone’s summation of 
particular precepts of eighteenth-century common law.  Part II then 
demonstrates the falsity of the claim that, at the time of the 
Founding, the common law was “uniform throughout the nation 
(rather than different from state to state),”25 and the import of Part 
III is that common law jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century centuries—although perhaps purporting to “discover” 
rather than “create” law—in fact engaged in fairly self-conscious 
processes of law-making when participating in common law 
adjudication.  These two critiques, which represent novel, and 
perhaps fundamental challenges to the coherence of constitutional 
originalism as currently practiced, may even, as Part IV 
preliminarily suggests, point the way toward a principled 
                                                 
23 See infra Part IV.   
24 Although a broad range of thinkers, including Akhil Reed Amar, Randy 
Barnett, and Judge Michael McConnell, all identify themselves as originalists of 
one variety or another, this Article will focus primarily on the writings of Justice 
Antonin Scalia, which both provide an extremely prominent theoretical model 
and demonstrate its implementation.   
The difficulties in reconciling theory with practice are, of course, 
legion, yet the common law tradition is replete with theories generated out of 
practice, such as those of Sir Edward Coke, Matthew Hale, and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.  Indeed, one notable characteristic of the common law is the extent to 
which some of the most powerful theories of its operation emanate out of and 
function in relation to practical legal application.  Despite eschewing certain 
aspects of the common law, Justice Scalia stands within this particular line of 
theorist/practitioners. 
25 SCALIA, supra note 8, at 10. 
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compromise between the extremes of an unbridled living 
constitutionalism and originalist ad hockery.  
  
  
I ORIGINALISTS’ TAKE ON THE COMMON LAW 
 
In his most comprehensive account of originalist 
constitutional interpretation, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law 
System, Scalia insists that the emphasis upon the common law in 
American law schools inculcates a predilection for a type of 
reasoning that leads to the view that the Constitution should be 
interpreted in a flexible manner as a “living” document.26  This 
common law model, Scalia maintains, “is not the way of 
construing a democratically adopted text.”27  Permitting judges, 
rather than democratically chosen officials or democratically 
ratified amendments, to alter the meaning of the Constitution, lacks 
legitimacy.28  Instead, the Constitution should be interpreted 
textually, in a manner similar to statutes.29  Textual interpretation 
does not simply rely on the language of the Constitution, but places 
emphasis on “context” as well.30  The most relevant context is not 
the actual intentions of the Founders, but evidence of the “original 
meaning” of the document’s words.31  Furthermore, following 
                                                 
26 See SCALIA, supra note 8, at 38 (“The ascendant school of constitutional 
interpretation affirms the existence of what is called The Living Constitution, a 
body of law that (unlike normal statutes) grows and changes from age to age, in 
order to meet the needs of a changing society. . . .  [I]t is the common law 
returned, but infinitely more powerful than what the old common law ever 
pretended to be, for now it trumps even the statutes of democratic legislatures.”).  
27 Id. at 40. 
28 Id. at 9-14. 
29 Id. at 23-25; 40-41. 
30 Id. at 38. 
31 Id.  Here Scalia’s view diverges from that of some other prominent 
originalists, including those of Keith Whittington, who, in Constitutional 
Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review, defends 
a vision of originalism directed at discerning the Framers’ intent in crafting 
particular constitutional provisions.   
According to Randy Barnett’s gloss on the relationship between 
“original meaning” and “original intent,” “Whereas ‘original intent’ originalism 
seeks the intentions or will of the lawmakers or ratifiers, ‘original meaning’ 
originalism seeks the public or objective meaning that a reasonable listener 
would place on the words used in the constitutional provision at the time of its 
enactment.”  BARNETT, supra note 2, at 92.  Jack Rakove further distinguished 
between the search for intentions and understandings in the pursuit of original 
meaning:  “Meaning must be derived from usage . . . and it is at this point that 
the alternative formulations of original intention and understanding become 
pertinent.  Intention connotes purpose and forethought, and it is accordingly best 
applied to those actors whose decisions produced the constitutional language 
whose meaning is at issue . . . .  Understanding, by contrast, may be used more 
broadly to cover the impressions and interpretations of the Constitution formed 
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Ronald Dworkin’s distinction, although applying it quite 
differently, Scalia insists that we should consider “semantic” rather 
than “expectation” meanings, or “what the text would reasonably 
be understood to mean, rather than . . . what it was intended to 
mean.”32 
One of the primary sources for discerning this meaning is, 
of course, eighteenth-century English common law, and, most 
prominently, William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England.33 In attempting to discover original meanings, Scalia 
examines a more comprehensive selection of writings from the 
period surrounding ratification than simply documents by the 
Framers, looking, for example, at texts by Thomas Jefferson and 
John Jay.34  He places particular priority, however, on the vision of 
the common law that Blackstone expressed.  Responding to 
Gordon Wood’s critique of his account of judicial review based 
upon Sir Edward Coke’s decision to review a statute with reference 
to the common law in Bonham’s Case, Scalia writes: “The genuine 
orthodoxy is set forth in Blackstone. . . .  The record does not, I 
think, support Professor Wood’s belief that Blackstone was setting 
forth a new, eighteenth-century doctrine, spawned by ‘the 
emergence . . . of the idea of parliamentary sovereignty and the 
positivist conception of law.’  Blackstone was not new; Dr. 
                                                                                                             
by its original readers.”  JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND 
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1996).   
Ronald Dworkin introduced the contrast between “semantic” and 
“expectation” originalism into debates about the subject.  He identified “two 
forms of originalism: ‘semantic’ originalism, which insists that the rights-
granting clauses be read to say what those who made them intended to say, and 
‘expectation’ originalism, which holds that these clauses should be understood 
to have the consequences that those who made them expected them to have.”  
Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at 
115, 119. 
32 ANTONIN SCALIA, Reponse, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, 
at 129, 144; see also Barnett, supra note 2, at 93 (approving Dworking’s 
distinction between semantic and expectations originalism and advocating the 
former over the latter). 
33 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-
69). 
34 SCALIA, supra note 8, at 38 (“I will consult the writings of some men who 
happened to be delegates to the Constitutional Convention—Hamilton’s and 
Madison’s writings in The Federalist, for example.  I do so , however, not 
because they were Framers and therefore their intent is authoritative and must be 
the law; but rather because their writings, like those of other intelligent and 
informed people of the time, display how the text of the Constitution was 
originally understood.  Thus I give equal weight to Jay’s pieces in The 
Federalist, and to Jefferson’s writings, even though neither of them was a 
Framer.  What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a 
statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen 
intended.”). 
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Bonham’s case was eccentric.”35  Although expressing an 
interpretation of, in particular, the respective places of legislative 
and judicial power at the time of the Founding, this passage 
indicates the weight that Scalia generally accords to Blackstone as 
well as the potential temporal discontinuities between particular 
instantiations of the common law. 
In applying his method to deciding—or dissenting in—
specific constitutional cases, Scalia consistently emphasizes 
eighteenth-century English common law, and the work of 
Blackstone, only secondarily alluding to any developments in the 
colonies or the states, and generally for the purpose of confirming 
or substantiating the applicability of Blackstone’s statements.36  
Referring in one case to Blackstone’s Commentaries as “widely 
read and ‘accepted [by the Founding generation] as the most 
satisfactory exposition of the common law of England,’”37 Scalia 
usually looks first to Blackstone then only subsequently and 
minimally elsewhere.38  Other justices and judges who do not 
explicitly adopt an originalist method likewise tend to rely heavily 
on Blackstone’s statements about the state of eighteenth-century 
common law.39  This emphasis is not irrational, and scholars have 
frequently reinforced Blackstone’s pre-eminence in the America of 
the Founding generation: “First published in America in 1771, with 
subsequent republication in 1790 and 1799, Blackstone’s 
Commentaries soon became the most widely read legal text in late-
                                                 
35 SCALIA, supra note 32, at 130. 
36 See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 452 (1996) 
(relying on Blackstone, among others, in interpreting the Seventh Amendment, 
for the proposition that, “[a]t common law, review of judgments was had only 
on writ of error, limited to questions of law”). 
37 Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 472 (2001) 
38 See, e.g., Deck v. Missouri, 2005 S. Ct. 2007, 2017 (2005) (relying on 
Blackstone and Coke for the proposition that “English common law in the 17th 
and 18th centuries recognized a rule against bringing the defendant in irons to the 
bar for trial”); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-50 (2004) (interpreting 
the meaning of the Confrontation Clause against the backdrop of the common 
law as expressed by Blackstone and insisting that deviations from “live 
testimony in court subject to adversarial testing” in England and the colonies did 
not call into question the clear import of the common law principle).   
39 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 712 (1997) (Rehnquist, J.) 
(referring to “Sir William Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of 
England not only provided a definitive summary of the common law but was 
also a primary legal authority for 18th- and 19th-century American lawyers”).  
For scholarship insisting on the primacy of Blackstone for the Founding 
generation, see DONALD LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 143 (1988); EDWARD CORWIN, THE ‘HIGHER LAW’ 
BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 84-85 (1955); and Dennis 
R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of 
Intellectual Impact, 51 NYU L. REV. 731 (1976).  
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eighteenth-century America—essential reading for any aspiring 
lawyer.”40 
Although sanctified by the Supreme Court and 
comprehensive in scope, however, Blackstone’s writings were 
hardly sophisticated accounts of English common law, as David 
Lieberman and others have artfully demonstrated.41  Indeed, at 
least two pragmatic purposes underlay the Commentaries, 
rendering them a strategic intervention into the common law rather 
than simply a synopsis of existing doctrine: on the one hand, 
Blackstone initially delivered them as the first English lectures on 
law for non-law students, and, on the other, he aimed through them 
to show legislators the problems with the state of the common law 
so that they might be inclined to exercise their statutory authority 
in amending it.42  As Blackstone’s attempt to affect legislation 
suggests, he wrote at a point when the common law itself was on 
the wane, and parliamentary supremacy had been definitively 
established.43  This was not, however, the state of affairs in the 
seventeenth century, when the original colonies were established; 
as a result, Blackstone’s vision of the relationship between 
statutory and common law may not accurately represent the 
indigenous American tradition.44   
Nor is it solely in this respect that Blackstone’s authority—
or the eighteenth-century English vision of the common law more 
generally—have proved incomplete or misleading in constitutional 
adjudication.  Originalism’s insistence on an original meaning has 
often translated into the attempt to extract an original meaning 
from potentially divergent strands of common law.  This tendency 
manifests itself within particular cases when originalists maintain 
the univocality of the common law against other justices’ 
protestations that the record is hardly monolithic.  For instance, in 
construing a statute prohibiting the knowing transportation in 
interstate commerce of “falsely made, forged, altered, or 
counterfeited securities,” Justice Marshall maintained that the 
phrase “falsely made” could not simply be thought to ventriloquize 
                                                 
40 Davison M. Douglas, Foreword: The Legacy of St. George Tucker, 47 
WILLIAM AND MARY L. REV. 1112-13 (2006). 
41 See generally DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION 
DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (2002).  
42 Id. at 31-32; 56.   
43 See Gordon Wood, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 
8, at 49, 50-53. 
44 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 30 (1967) (observing that, “Just as the colonists cited with 
enthusiasm the theorists of universal reason, so too did they associate 
themselves, with offhand familiarity, with the tradition of the English common 
law.  The great figures of England’s legal history, especially the seventeenth-
century common lawyers, were referred to repeatedly—by the colonial lawyers 
above all, but by others as well”); see also infra note 110. 
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the common law because the “plurality of definitions of ‘falsely 
made’ substantially undermines . . . reliance on the ‘common-law 
meaning’ principle.”45  As Marshall interpreted it: 
That rule of construction, after all, presumes simply that 
Congress accepted the one meaning for an undefined 
statutory term that prevailed at common law.  Where, 
however, no fixed usage existed at common law, we think 
it more appropriate to inquire which of the common-law 
readings of the term best accords with the overall purpose 
of the statute rather than to simply assume, for example, 
that Congress adopted the reading that was followed by the 
largest number of common-law courts.46  
Dissenting, Justice Scalia instead endeavored to establish that a 
particular common law meaning could, in fact, be discerned.47  In 
doing so, he established a fairly strong presumption of common 
law unity, suggesting that litigants must argue strenuously for the 
proposition that a single common law meaning did not inhere in a 
term or phrase because of divergent or conflicting strands.  
According to Scalia: 
The Court acknowledges the principle that common-law 
terms ought to be given their established common-law 
meanings, but asserts that the principle is inapplicable here 
because the meaning of ‘falsely made’ I have described 
above ‘was not universal.’ . . .  If [] minimal 
‘divergence’—by States with statutes that did not include 
the term ‘falsely made’ . . . —is sufficient to eliminate a 
common-law meaning long accepted by virtually all the 
courts by apparently all the commentators, the principle of 
common-law meaning might as well be frankly 
abandoned.48  
Although Justice Marshall’s and Justice Scalia’s conflicting 
visions of the role of disparities within the common law tradition 
arose in the context of determining whether a statutory phrase 
should be interpreted as encapsulating a particular common law 
meaning, the debate could easily be transferred to the 
constitutional arena.  Scalia has, indeed, similarly discounted 
minority views of the common law at the time of the Founding in 
deriving the original meaning of particular constitutional clauses.49   
                                                 
45 Moskal v. United states, 498 U.S. 103, 116 (1990). 
46 Moskal, 498 U.S. at 116-17 (1990).   
47 Id. at 122 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“‘Falsely made’ is, in other words, a term 
laden with meaning in the common law, because it describes an essential 
element of the crime of forgery.”). 
48 Id. at 129 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
49 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, n. 5, 73 (2004) (dismissing 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s claim that “English law’s treatment of testimonial 
statements was inconsistent at the time of the framing” and his argument that, 
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This emphasis on a singular original meaning is correlated 
with an account of the common law at the time of the Founding as 
a monolithic body unaffected by statutory developments and also 
as much more static than our current conception would suggest.  In 
Crawford v. Washington, a case determining that the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment generally bars the admission of 
out-of-court testimonial statements by witnesses whom the 
defendants have not had prior opportunity to cross-examine, 
Justice Scalia assessed the scope of the common law’s rule on this 
subject by carving out the influence that several sixteenth-century 
statutes had had upon it.50  Whereas these laws passed under 
Queen Mary had permitted “justices of the peace to examine 
suspects and witnesses in felony cases and to certify the results to 
the court,” the outcomes of which examinations “came to be used 
as evidence in some cases,”51 Scalia maintains that they should not 
be considered part of the common law, but rather statutes in 
derogation thereof.52  This rigid distinction between statutory and 
common law was not entirely consistent with the views of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century common lawyers, including 
none other than Sir Matthew Hale and Blackstone himself.53  
Magna Carta, although sometimes included within the 
understanding of the common law, was considered similar to a 
statute, and, in turn, other legislation, such as the series of Habeas 
Corpus Acts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, entered 
into the protections that the common law itself provided for the 
liberty of the subject.  Justice Scalia’s tendency to separate 
common from statutory law at the time of the Founding and 
prioritize the former over the latter is all the more strange in light 
of his frequently reiterated claim that legislatures, not judges, 
should make law.54 
Nor, for Scalia, was the common law at the time of the 
Founding an evolving body, at least not according to his account of 
the apperceptions of eighteenth-century thinkers.  As Scalia 
claimed in “Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System”:  
                                                                                                             
“[b]etween 1700 and 1800 the rules regarding the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements were still being developed. . . .   It is an odd conclusion indeed to 
think that the Framers created a cut-and-dried rule with respect to the 
admissibility of testimonial statements when the law during their own times was 
not fully settled.”); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 473 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (discounting “stray statements and doctrines found in the historical 
record”).   
50 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-47. 
51 Id. at 43-44. 
52 Id. at n. 5. 
53 See infra Part III.   
54 See SCALIA, supra note 8, at 9-14 (arguing for the greater legitimacy of law-
making by statute than by judicial decision). 
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[Madison] wrote in an era when the prevailing image of the 
common law was that of a preexisting body of rules, 
uniform throughout the nation (rather than different from 
state to state), that judges merely ‘discovered’ rather than 
created.  It is only in this century, with the rise of legal 
realism, that we came to acknowledge that judges in fact 
‘make’ the common law, and that each state has its own.55 
Scalia further elaborated on the static understanding of the 
common law that he attributes to Madison and the other Founders 
in his dissent in Rogers v. Tennessee.56  There he explained that 
Blackstone permitted the abrogation of “bad law,” but not the 
abandonment of a rule the reason for which had altered.57  He 
likewise maintained that the “original” understanding of the 
common law did not comport with “modern ‘common law 
decisionmaking’,” which involves “[bringing] the law into 
conformity with reason and common sense,’ by ‘laying to rest an 
archaic and outdated rule.’”  Instead, “[a]t the time of the framing, 
common-law jurists believed (in the words of Sir Francis Bacon) 
that the judge’s ‘office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret 
law and not to make law, or give law.’”58  
It is worth noting, however, that Justice Scalia himself 
sometimes endorses a use of common law history that partakes of 
the same traits that he disparages of “bringing the law into 
conformity with reason and common sense.”  Justice Scalia joined 
Justice Thomas’s reasoning in his dissent in Deck v. Missouri, a 
case holding that shackling a defendant at trial violated his due 
process rights absent an essential state interest specific to the 
defendant.59  In rejecting the majority’s attempt to derive a 
prohibition against shackling from the common law, Thomas 
insisted that, although “English common law in the 17th and 18th 
centuries recognized a rule against bringing the defendant in irons 
to the bar for trial,”60 this rule was not determinative because it 
was grounded in a concern that irons would cause defendants 
excessive pain, rather than the kinds of rationales adduced by the 
majority in support of its due process analysis.61  Thomas and 
Scalia thus acknowledged that the reasons underlying a common 
law practice might alter over time, but they simultaneously 
required that those advocating interpretation of a constitutional 
provision against the backdrop of a particular common law rule 
demonstrate that the basis for the principle remain the same today 
                                                 
55 Scalia, supra note 8, at 10.   
56 Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001). 
57 Id. at 473. 
58 Id. at 472. 
59 Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. St. 2007 (2005).   
60 Id.  
61 Id.   
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as it was in the eighteenth century.  In this opinion, Thomas and 
Scalia approached closer to a Holmesian account of the evolution 
of the common law than Scalia’s theoretical writings would 
suggest, allowing for judicial abrogation of those rules that 
decision-makers deem no longer applicable to the contemporary 
situation.62   
It is, perhaps, the prospect of a bleak alternative for 
originalists that deters Scalia and other originalists from 
recognizing the multifaceted and shifting quality of the American 
common law tradition.  Acknowledging that “the principal defect 
[of originalism]” consists in the fact that “historical research is 
always difficult and sometimes inconclusive,” Scalia at the same 
time insists that it remains a more democratically legitimate and 
less arbitrary approach to constitutional decision-making, and, 
therefore, judges must at least attempt to figure out a singular 
original meaning.63  
The difficulties that ensue from relying on a unified 
common law, however, come to the fore in a series of cases 
treating the history of sentencing, including both the separation of 
powers challenge to the U.S. Sentencing Commission in United 
States v. Mistretta and the more recent line of cases, culminating in 
United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan, that insisted 
in various contexts that facts enhancing an offender’s sentence be 
tried to a jury rather than simply before a judge.64  In Apprendi, 
                                                 
62 According to Holmes: 
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a 
formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity 
disappears, but the rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule 
has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how 
it is to be accounted for. Some ground of policy is thought of, which 
seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things; 
and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been 
found for it, and enters on a new career.  The old form receives a new 
content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning 
which it has received. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881). 
63 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 
(1989); see also BARNETT, supra note 2, at 114 (arguing that original meanings 
originalism is viable because it is usually possible to find one explanation that is 
more likely than the others).  Some might contend that Scalia’s jurisprudence is 
more formalist than originalist, in that the it places priority on discerning a 
single rule for decision over discovering an actual “original meaning.”  Under 
this view, originalism simply serves the function of constraining judicial 
discretion particularly well.  This does not, however, as Keith Whittington has 
elaborated, explain why one would choose originalism over other approaches to 
ensuring judicial minimalism (by, for example, insisting that judges examine all 
recent democratic decisions related to a particular case and arrive at the 
determination most consistent with these outcomes).  
64 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); United States v. Fanfan, 543 
U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); Apprendi v. 
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Justice Stevens’ opinion for the majority recited a number of 
authorities suggesting that judges possessed little discretion over 
sentencing in the late eighteenth century.65  According to Stevens: 
“As Blackstone, among many others, has made clear, ‘the 
judgment, though pronounced or awarded by the judges, is not 
their determination or sentence, but the determination and sentence 
of the law.’”66  These claims contradicted the historical account 
provided in Mistretta—admittedly derived from the post- rather 
than pre-constitutional moment—affirming judges’ substantial 
independence in sentencing in the early Republic.67  As Justice 
O’Connor observed in her dissent, they also contrasted with the 
Court’s description of the relevant state of affairs in Williams v. 
New York,68 a case that had proclaimed:  “Both before and since 
the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and 
in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge 
could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of 
evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of 
punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.”69   
Each of the cases within this specific line simultaneously 
attempts to construct a univocal originalist interpretation of the 
historical sources and contradicts the account provided by other 
cases treating the same subject.70  While the difficulty of deriving a 
singular history of the common law approach to sentencing around 
the time of the Founding does not automatically render such an 
endeavor valueless to pursue such an endeavor, the contradictions 
pervading the history set forth in a single line of cases do suggest 
the potential value of acknowledging the discrepancies within the 
historical record and proceeding from there.  
 
 
 
II THE COMMON LAW: A DISUNIFIED FIELD 
  
In contrast to Justice Scalia’s impressions of the state of the 
common law at the time of the Framing, writings from the 
                                                                                                             
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 
(1989).  
65 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479-80. 
66 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479-80. 
67 Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 651. 
68 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
69 Id. at 246. 
70 Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The 
Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 
GEO. L.J. 183, 201-203 (2005) (arguing that formalism, not originalism, was the 
driving force in the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases, precisely because the 
historical evidence as to judicial discretion in sentencing is inconclusive).   
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Founding era and materials from the states in the period following 
ratification demonstrate that the common law occupied a disunified 
field in the late eighteenth century.  Some members of the 
Founding generation expressed extensive criticism of the common 
law, and they argued about the degree to which it remained in 
force in the newly forged United States.  The very definition and 
scope of the common law—including its permeability to statutory 
innovation, its longevity, its potential for local variations, and its 
relation to the “ancient constitution” securing the rights of the 
people—was subject to serious contestation.  These controversies 
about the nature of the common law in America undermine any 
attempt to represent it as a fixed and unified entity neatly 
encapsulated by Blackstone’s vision. 
Thomas Jefferson’s critiques of Blackstone and the 
common law have been widely noted,71 along with his scathing 
assertion that: 
Blackstone and Hume have made Tories of all England, 
and are making Tories of those young Americans whose 
native feelings of independence do not place them above 
the wily sophistries of a Hume or a Blackstone.  These two 
books, but especially the former, have done more towards 
the suppression of the liberties of man, than all the millions 
of men in arms of Bonaparte, and the millions of human 
lives with the sacrifice of which he will stand loaded before 
the judgment seat of his Maker.72 
What has been less thoroughly discussed is the pervasive nature of 
criticism of and debates about the common law.  John Adams and 
James Madison were two of the other figures prominently engaged 
in such writings.  Both Jefferson’s and Madison’s stances upon the 
common law became more critical during the course of their 
careers.  Whereas Jefferson in 1790 included Blackstone’s 
Commentaries in his list of readings for law students and its 
influence is apparent in the Declaration of Independence, by 1810 
he began to disparage the text, preferring Coke’s Institutes and 
Reports and maintaining that Blackstone provided “nothing more 
than an elegant digest of what [students] will have acquired from 
the real fountains of the law.”73  He similarly expressed political 
                                                 
71 See, e.g., David Thomas Konig, Legal Fictions and the Rule(s) of Law: The 
Jeffersonian Critique of Common-Law Adjudication, in THE MANY LEGALITIES 
OF EARLY AMERICA 97-117 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann eds., 
2001); Julius S. Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone’s Commentaries, 
in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 451-88 (David H. 
Flaherty ed.).  
72 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Horatio G. Spafford (March 17, 1814), in 
WRITINGS 6 (Washington ed.), at 335. 
73 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Judge Tyler (1812), in WORKS 11 (Ford ed.), at 
142; see generally Waterman, supra note 71, at 460-65; 478, for discussion of 
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reservations about Blackstone’s conservatism, as well as the 
distinguished jurist Mansfield’s influence upon him.74  Madison 
likewise refrained from expressing significantly negative views on 
the common law until later in his career.  The Alien and Sedition 
Acts and prosecutions under them constituted an intervening 
incident that may have affected both Jefferson’s and Madison’s 
views about Blackstone and the common law.75 
One of the most striking varieties of disagreement 
concerned how far back one had to investigate to discover what 
could truly be called common law.  Jefferson himself insisted on a 
very specific temporality for the common law, dating it back 
before the Magna Carta and describing it as “that part of the 
English law which was anterior to the date of the oldest statutes 
extant.”76  He was likewise concerned in several contexts to 
diagnose the inaccuracies introduced into the account of this 
immemorial common law by subsequent writers.  In arguing 
against the maxim that Christianity is part of the common law, 
Jefferson insisted upon the necessity of exploring the authority by 
which common law judges propounded various points and 
maintained that, “in latter times, we take no judge’s word for what 
the law is, further than he is warranted by the authorities he 
appeals to.  His decision may bind the unfortunate individual who 
happens to be the particular subject of it; but it cannot alter the 
law.”77  According to Jefferson’s argument, the belief that 
Christianity was incorporated into the common law derived from 
one fundamental misreading, so that “this string of authorities, 
                                                                                                             
the apparent alteration in Jefferson’s estimation of Blackstone. For the variety of 
legal and political sources available to the Founding generation, see BERNARD 
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22-54 
(1967).  
74 Waterman, supra note 71, at 462-72. 
75 For discussion of the impact of these events on Jefferson, see Waterman, 
supra note 71, at 482-85; Powell, supra note 2, at 924-35. 
76 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 202 (1801); see also 
Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Thomas Cooper (1814) (“[W]e know that the 
common law is that system of law which was introduced by the Saxons on their 
settlement in England, and altered from time to time by proper legislative 
authority from that time to the date of Magna Charta, which terminates the 
period of the common law, or lex non scripta, and commences that of the statute 
law, or Lex Scripta”); Waterman, supra note 71, at 465-67 (“It was Jefferson’s 
view that the common law ended with the Magna Carta, that subsequent 
development came by way of statute law, and that the common law, the rights of 
Englishmen, and the English constitution were Saxon in origin . . . and that the 
American colonists had assumed the long lost rights of the Saxons and had won 
a victory in the war against the English king and his lawyers”). 
77 Letter to Thomas Cooper, supra note 76; see also Thomas Jefferson, Letter to 
Major John Cartwright (June 5, 1824) 397, in MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, 
AND MISCELLANIES 3 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed. 1829) (reciting a similar 
argument against the claim that “Christianity is parcel of the laws of England”). 
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when examined to the beginning, all hang[] on the same hook, a 
perverted expression of Prisot’s, or on one another, or nobody.”78  
In treating the American acceptation of the common law, 
Jefferson also argued that only earlier English judicial decisions 
should be cited.  As he explained, “the state of the English law at 
the date of our emigration, constituted the system adopted here.  
We may doubt, therefore, the propriety of quoting in our courts 
English authorities subsequent to that adoption; still more, the 
admission of authorities posterior to the Declaration of 
Independence, or rather to the accession of that King, whose reign, 
ab initio, was that very tissue of wrongs which rendered the 
Declaration at length necessary.”79  Such a strategy would “get[] us 
rid of all Mansfield’s innovations, or civilisations [i.e., making into 
civil law] of the common law.”80  Discussing “the case of the 
interrogatories in Pennsylvania,” Jefferson maintained in an 1788 
letter that “I hold it essential, in America, to forbid that any 
English decision which has happened since the accession of Lord 
Mansfield to the bench, should ever be cited in a court: because, 
though there have come many good ones from him, yet there is so 
much sly poison instilled into a great part of them, that it is better 
to proscribe the whole.”81  Jefferson’s stance on the temporality of 
the common law was thus two-fold:  He at once insisted that the 
common law derived from the ancient, pre-Magna Carta past, and 
at the same time attempted to persuade American jurists that it 
would be inappropriate to consider the opinions of recent British 
judges as relevant authority on the dictates of the common law—
not exactly because the American experience had diverged from 
the British but rather because recent English interpreters had 
introduced corruptions into the common law itself.  
John Adams similarly dated the true common law back 
into the distant past and in places adopted the rhetoric of the 
“ancient constitution”—or, alternatively, the “British 
constitution”—to which he often referred in conjunction with the 
common law.82  Just as Jefferson had argued that Christianity had 
                                                 
78 Id.  
79 Letter to Judge Tyler (June 17, 1812) 178 in MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, 
AND MISCELLANIES 4.   
80 Id.   
81 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Mr. Cutting (Oct. 2, 1788) 370 in MEMOIRS, 
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES 2.  This letter provides an earlier 
example of Jefferson’s negative views on Mansfield than the evidence that 
Waterman cites and suggests that Jefferson’s anti-Blackstonian opinions may 
have solidified even earlier than Waterman’s account represents.   
82 For the theory of the “ancient constitution,” see J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT 
CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL 
THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1987).  John Reid has analyzed in 
detail the uses to which the rhetoric of the ancient constitution were put in 
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only been incorporated into the common law at a late date by a 
series of misreadings of authority, Adams argued, against recent 
claims to the contrary, that, “by the common law of England, the 
judges of the king’s bench and common bench had [not] estates for 
life in their offices, determinable on misbehavior, and determinable 
also on the demise of the crown.”83  In doing so, he described the 
common law as “used time out of mind, or for a time whereof the 
memory of man runneth not to the contrary.”84  This immemorial 
common law dated back to a period preceding the reign of King 
Richard I.85  Although Adams’ investigation into the tenure of 
English judges commenced from the vantage point of Blackstone, 
he rapidly examined the views of other writers to check Blackstone 
against them.86  Through this historical research, Adams arrived at 
the conclusion that the tenure of judges during good behavior 
originated not with the common law itself but only during the reign 
of King Charles I during the first half of the seventeenth century.87  
In denying that more recent approaches to judicial appointments 
and removal should be construed as part of the common law, 
Adams implicitly insisted on the return to an early seventeenth-
century version of the common law, that in place before the 
accession of Charles I.   
                                                                                                             
eighteenth-century America.  See JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT 
CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LIBERTY (2005).   
The extent to which Adams viewed the British or ancient constitution 
as isomorphic with the common law is not entirely clear from his writings.  One 
passage from his writings on the scope of English judges’ independence 
suggests that he deemed at least the contemporary British constitution—if not 
the ancient constitution—distinguishable from the common law.  See 566 
(“Many people receive different ideas from the words legally and 
constitutionally.  The law has certainly established in the crown many 
prerogatives, by the bare exertion of which, in their utmost extent, the nation 
might be undone.  The prerogatives of war and peace, and of pardon, for 
examples, among many others.  Yet it would be absurd to say that the crown can 
constitutionally ruin the nation, and overturn the constitution.  The British 
constitution is a fine, a nice, a delicate machine; and the perfection of it depends 
upon such complicated movements, that it is as easily disordered as the human 
body; and in order to act constitutionally, every one must do his duty.”).  For a 
general discussion of the evolving understanding of the relation between the 
legal and constitutional orders, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969), at 259-68. 
83 From the Boston Gazette, Feb. 1, 1773, in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 3 
(Boston, 1851), at 540.   
84 Id.   
85 Id. at 564 (“I think it has been determined by all the judges in England that 
time of memory should be limited to the reign of King Richard I; and every rule 
of common law must be beyond the time of memory, that is, as ancient as the 
reign of that king, and continued down generally until it is altered by authority 
of parliament.”).   
86 Id. at 541. 
87 Id. at 551. 
 22 
The extent to which the common law had been imported 
into and bound the colonies was also the subject of significant 
debate.  The standard account provided by Justice Story indicated 
that “Our ancestors brought with them . . . [the] general principles 
[of the common law], and claimed it as their birth-right; but they 
brought with them and adopted only that portion which was 
applicable to their condition.”88  John Adams, in particular, resisted 
the notions that the common law had been introduced wholesale 
into America, as part of the British Empire, and that it, as a result, 
both restricted the colonists and granted them the liberties 
accorded all Englishmen.  As he contended, the common law, and 
the rights conferred by the English Constitution, adhered to the 
individual discoverer, who could adapt them to the American 
context to the extent that he desired.89  Furthermore, the several 
charters granted by the King as well as his commissions to colonial 
governors had constituted compacts guaranteeing the colonists the 
same rights as British subjects.90  Adams therefore rejected Daniel 
Leonard’s claim as Massachusettensis “that in denying that the 
colonies are annexed to the realm, and subject to the authority of 
parliament, individuals and bodies of men subvert the 
fundamentals of government, deprive us of British liberties, and 
build up absolute monarchy in the colonies.”91  The mere fact that 
the entirety of the common law had not emigrated to America 
along with the colonists did not mean that the privileges accorded 
                                                 
88 Van Ness v. Packard, 2 Peters 144 (1829). 
89 John Adams, Address to the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay 
(Feb. 6, 1775) 30, in NOVANGLUS AND MASSACHUSETTENSIS (Boston, 1849) 
(“the common law, and the authority of parliament founded on it, never 
extended beyond the four seas”); John Adams, Address to the Inhabitants of the 
Colony of Massachusetts Bay (March 13, 1775) 95, in id. (“How then do we, 
New Englandmen, derive our laws?  I say, not from parliament, not from 
common law, but from the law of nature, and the compact made with the king in 
our charters.  Our ancestors were entitled to the common law of England, when 
they emigrated, that is, to just so much of it as they pleased to adopt, and no 
more.”); John Adams, Address to the Inhabitants of the Colony of 
Massachusetts Bay (March 27, 1775) 116, in id. (“the court, when they said that 
all laws in force in England, are in force in the discovered country, meant no 
more than that the discoverers had a right to all such laws, if they chose to adopt 
them”). 
90 Adams, March 13 Address, 98 (“admitting these notions of the common and 
feudal law to have been in full force, and that the king was absolute in America, 
when it was settled; yet he had a right to enter into a contract with his subjects, 
and stipulate that they should enjoy all the rights and liberties of Englishmen 
forever, in consideration of their undertaking to clear the wilderness, propagate 
Christianity, pay a fifth part of ore, &c.  Such a contract as this has been made 
with all the colonies; royal governments, as well as charter ones.  For the 
commissions to the governors contain the plan of the government, and the 
contract between the king and subject, in the former, as much as the charters in 
the latter.”). 
91 Id. at 96. 
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by the “ancient constitution” or “British constitution” were 
abandoned.  Parts of the common law, along with these liberties, 
were instead provided contractually, through compact between the 
King and his American subjects.92      
After ratification of the U.S. Constitution, debates about 
the continued relevance of British common law became 
reformulated, focusing on whether a federal common law had ever 
existed, or still continued to supplement those versions of the 
common law in force in the several states.  The Alien and Sedition 
Acts supplied the focal point of the controversy, because their 
proponents claimed for them the virtue of being consistent with 
English common law.93  One commentator lauded President 
Jefferson for “seek[ing] no asylum within a sedition law, [nor] . . . 
screen[ing] himself under the tyrannical construction of the 
Common Law of England.”94  Jefferson’s own writings confirmed 
this suggestion.  As Jefferson wrote to Edmund Randolph in 1799, 
“Of all the doctrines which have ever been broached by the federal 
government, the novel one, of the common law being in force and 
                                                 
92 A 1774 debate recorded in Adams’ diary on the sources of American’s rights 
may have provided the backdrop for his subsequent writings on the subject, 
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grounding our rights on the laws and constitution of the country from 
whence we sprung, and charters, without recurring to the law of nature; 
because this will be a feeble support.  Charters are compacts between 
the Crown and the people, and I think on this foundation the charter 
governments stand firm. 
 England is governed by a limited monarchy and free 
constitution.  Privileges of Englishmen were inherent, their birthright 
and inheritance, and cannot be deprived of them without their consent. 
371-72. 
Jefferson’s 1812 comments on the subject were similar to Adams’.  As 
he wrote in his letter to Judge Tyler, “On the other subject of your letter, the 
application of the common law to our present situation, I deride with you the 
ordinary doctrine, that we brought with us from England the common law rights.  
This narrow notion was a favorite in the first moment of rallying to our rights 
against Great Britain.  But it was that of men, who felt their rights before they 
had thought of their explanation.  The truth is, that we brought with us the rights 
of men; or expatriated men.  On our arrival here, the question would at once 
arise, by what law will we govern ourselves?  The resolution seems to have 
been, by that system with which we are familiar, to be altered by ourselves 
occasionally, and adapted to our new situation.”  Letter to Judge Tyler, supra 
note 79, at 178.   
93 For a summary of this argument, see James Madison, Report on the 
Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session of 1799-1800, at 372, in THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 6 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). 
94 BENJAMIN AUSTIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLICANISM 147 (1803). 
 24 
cognizable as an existing law in their courts, is to me the most 
formidable.”95  For the common law to be in force federally, the 
government would have been obliged to adopt it positively, which 
it did not do as a general matter, unlike states such as Virginia.96 
The arguments against justifying the Alien and Sedition 
Acts on the basis of the common law contained in James 
Madison’s Report on the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions 
resisting these statutes are perhaps the most comprehensive.97  
Explaining first that the common law formed a part of the colonial 
codes, Madison at the same time observed that “[t]he common law 
was not the same in any two of the Colonies” and that “in some the 
modifications were materially and extensively different.”98  No 
general, national common law could, therefore, be extracted from 
the particular versions implemented in the colonies.99  Nor did the 
American Revolution suddenly alter the situation by “imply[ing] or 
introduc[ing] the common law as a law of the Union;”100 such a 
result would, Madison deemed, be “repugnant to the fundamental 
principle of the Revolution.”101  Finally, the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts granted by Article III of the U.S. Constitution 
stopped short of integrating the common law into the federal 
system.102  At none of these moments, the report opined, was the 
common law transferred in toto to the American context on the 
national level.   
In a set of statements particularly relevant to the claims 
made by contemporary originalists, however, Madison did 
acknowledge that “particular parts of the common law may have a 
sanction from the Constitution, so far as they are necessarily 
comprehended in the technical phrases which the powers delegated 
to the Government; and so far also as such other parts may be 
adopted by Congress as necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution the powers expressly delegated.”103  Even if English 
common law had not supplied the United States with a 
comprehensive federal system of jurisprudence, it could, according 
to the report, be employed in interpreting specific constitutional 
clauses.   
The caveats that the report expressed with respect to 
discerning what the federal common law would be, however, apply 
                                                 
95 Letter to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 18, 1799) vol. 3, p. 425. 
96 Id. at 427.   
97 For discussion of the genesis of this report, see Powell, supra note 2, at 924-
27. 
98 Madison, Report on the Resolutions, supra note 93, at 373.   
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equally to any attempt to identify the common law underpinnings 
of particular phrases in the Constitution.  Alluding to “the 
difficulties and confusion inseparable from a constructive 
introduction of the common law,” Madison enumerated several 
specific questions that would have to be answered about the nature 
and identity of this common law before it could be used.104  As the 
report asked: 
Is it to be the common law with or without the British 
statutes? . . . Is it to be the date of the eldest or the youngest 
of the Colonies?  Or are the dates to be thrown together and 
a medium deduced?  Or is our independence to be taken for 
the date?  Is, again, regard to be had to the various changes 
in the common law made by the local codes of America?  Is 
regard to be had to such changes, subsequent as well as 
prior to the establishment of the Constitution?  Is regard to 
be had to future as well as to past changes?105 
Between the difficulty of determining the relevant date of the 
common law to be examined and the problem of discerning the 
extent to which English or American statutes should be considered 
as modifying the common law, the report suggests that, even on 
the constitutional level, it may not be possible to obtain a coherent, 
singular exposition of a common law principle.   
Madison provided several examples of this difficulty, first 
treating the relationship between freedom of the press as 
guaranteed by the First Amendment and as treated by English 
common law, and indicating that “[t]he practice in America must 
be entitled to much more respect” than that in England in 
understanding the meaning of the constitutional clause, then 
turning to the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and 
asserting that “[i]t will never be admitted that the meaning of 
[freedom of conscience and religion], in the common law of 
England, is to limit their meaning in the United States.”106  
Common law constitutional interpretation would thus succumb to 
all the difficulties of ascertaining which common law might be at 
issue. 
Madison echoed many of these points in an 1824 letter, 
where he simultaneously rejected the notion of a federal common 
law and endorsed the idea that “the Constitution is predicated on 
the existence of the Common law . . . because it borrows therefrom 
terms which must be explained by Com. Law authorities.”107  At 
the end of the letter, Madison explained the usefulness of this 
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common law backdrop, which it appeared to him to be “impossible 
to digest . . . into a text that would be a compleat substitute.”108  
Although “[a] Justinian or Napoleon Code may ascertain, may 
elucidate, and even improve the existing law, . . . the meaning of 
its complex technical terms, in their application to particular cases, 
must be sought in like sources as before; and the smaller the 
compass of the text the more general must be its terms & the more 
necessary the resort to the usual guides in its particular 
applications.”109  The common law could, on this account, provide 
a set of background principles crucial to understanding the general 
terms of the Constitution, a text certainly of small compass if wide 
scope.   
These background principles did not speak with the same 
voice, however, Madison suggested even during the debates on the 
Constitution.  The language proposed for Article I, section 8, 
clause 10 initially granted Congress the power “To declare the law 
and punishment of piracies and felonies &c &c.”  According to 
James Wilson, the term “felonies” could be appropriately and 
definitively elaborated in accordance with common law.  Madison, 
by contrast, insisted that the language of declaration be replaced 
with that of definition, so that the clause would endow Congress 
with the capacity “To define and punish Piracies and Felonies 
committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of 
Nations.”  Congress should, Madison believed, be charged with 
constructing such a definition because: 
[F]elony at common law is vague.  It is also 
defective.  One defect is supplied by Stat. Of Anne as to 
running away with vessels which at common law was a 
breach of trust only.   
Besides no foreign law should be a standard farther 
than is expressly adopted.  If the laws of the States were to 
prevail on this subject, the Citizens of different States 
would be subject to different punishments for the same 
offence at Sea.  There would be neither uniformity nor 
stability in the law—The proper remedy for all these 
difficulties was to vest the power proposed by the term 
‘define’ in the Nat legislature. 
Although the common law might supply an interpretive tool for 
understanding constitutional phrases, it could not, Madison 
believed, entirely dictate the meaning of many of the 
Constitution’s clauses. 
The treatment of the common law—and divergences 
therefrom—in the early states further substantiates the Founding 
generation’s recognition that regional common law in America 
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deviated in parts significantly from its English model. The 
common law of the colonies and that of Britain had already 
displayed differences before the Revolution, and these did not 
disappear following ratification of the Constitution.110  Soon after 
St. George Tucker’s “republicanized” 1803 edition of Blackstone, 
which attempted to bring the Commentaries into conformity with 
the situation of Virginia, Hugh Henry Brackenridge, a judge of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, emulated this endeavor with his 
1814 Law Miscellanies, subtitled “An Introduction to the Study of 
the Law, Notes on Blackstone’s Commentaries, Shewing the 
Variations of the Law of Pennsylvania from the Law of 
England.”111  In Massachusetts, somewhat similar developments 
were afoot, and the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court 
lamented, in an 1804 letter to the Governor, that “[t]he law of the 
Commonwealth consists, principally, of common law; but this has 
been materially altered, not only by statute, but by various 
customs,” and that, therefore, “[o]f the whole, as a connected and 
consistent system, there exists, at present, no written exposition, to 
which a citizen, a student or a lawyer can have recourse.”112  This 
dismal state of affairs was the target of William Charles White’s 
subsequent 1808 Proposals for Publishing a Compendium and 
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Digest, of the Laws of Massachusetts.113  Explaining that “[t]he 
laws of this State are so embarrassed by perplexity, and entangled 
by confusion, that not only the researches of the student are 
thereby rendered slow, lingering, and almost disgusting; but even 
the practitioner in the haste of business, sometimes feels the want 
of a system, to guide and facilitate his references,” White 
attempted to reconcile statutory with common law in his 
compendium, and British with local precedents.114 
The tribulations facing the common law in Pennsylvania 
provide a particularly interesting example of the debates about the 
scope of its continuing relevance in the early states.  Controversy 
appears to have raged about whether Pennsylvania should, in fact, 
entirely abandon adherence to common law principles.115  As one 
commentator subsequently described the dispute, “Some years ago, 
in this state, a current set strongly against the common law of 
England; and it was within a point of being abolished by the 
legislature.  This was owing to a total ignorance of what it was.  
Editors of papers, who had been prosecuted for libels, raised this 
hue and cry, as it may be called, against the common law.”116  
Opponents of “the continuance of the Common Law of England in 
the United States” adduced six reasons in favor of its abrogation.117  
The justifications were as follows:  legislative changes in both 
England and America would subvert the unity of the common law 
and gradually bring about its extinction anyway; the common law 
could not, by its nature, apply to the situation of the United States, 
presumably because of the latter’s republican form of government; 
the common law did not boast uniformity even in England, where 
there were also many local customs; a disparity had arisen between 
American and English versions of the common law, to the extent 
that, “in some parts of the United States an American Common law 
has grown into existence.  In some the Common law of England 
has been formally abolished, and thus it becomes more and more 
difficult to ascertain what is the Common Law”; the statutory 
alterations of the common law in England had to some extent been 
adopted in America, but not entirely; and the most valuable parts 
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of the common law had already been incorporated into written 
instruments of government in the United States.118  These 
arguments range from the normative to the pragmatic.  On the one 
hand, opponents of the common law envisioned it as incompatible 
with the United States’ new form of government, except to the 
extent that domestic polities decided to adopt it in a democratically 
legitimate manner through statute or constitution.  On the other, 
they despaired that the common law was a common law at all, or at 
least that its commonality could be discerned across local 
boundaries and transnationally, especially given the complex 
interaction between unwritten and statutory law on both sides of 
the Atlantic.  
At the same time, the common law boasted some vigorous 
defenders, even in Pennsylvania.  Joseph Hopkinson, the author of 
Considerations on the Abolition of the Common Law in the United 
States, and an attorney for Samuel Chase during his impeachment 
trial, mounted a comprehensive response to the attackers.119  This 
rejoinder did not adopt a Scalia-like position on the uniformity and 
immutability of the common law, but rather lauded it as a 
compilation of the wisdom of centuries and a body of principles 
capable of adaptation.  As he maintained: 
Common Law is but another name for common sense, 
tested and systematically arranged by long experience.  
What governs the manners of men towards each other?  It 
is the common law of social intercourse.  What constitutes 
the habits and customs of a country, but a common law, 
gradually growing with civilization, and always 
accommodating itself to the situation of the people?  Nor is 
the Common Law of jurisprudence less pliable.  It is one of 
its excellencies that it is capable of change, of modification, 
of adapting itself to new situations and varying times, 
without losing its original character, its vital principles, its 
most useful institutions.120 
Hopkinson’s vision of the common law thus entailed adaptation 
within a framework of fundamental stability.  As a result, the 
common law in the United States might, as its opponents 
contended, be altered, but that process of alteration should, he 
believed, occur in a manner consistent with the common law’s own 
mode of evolution.121  The mere fact that the common law of 
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England and America had already diverged and might do so 
increasingly thus did not mean that the common law should be 
abandoned, but was a result consistent with the principles 
underlying the nature of common law reasoning itself.   
Nor did he deem insurmountable the difficulties with 
discerning what, in fact, constituted common law.  One of the 
virtues of the common law was, for Hopkinson, its very 
intricacy—and its ability to comprehend a variety of exceptions to 
a general rule.122  At the same time, he considered the rules of 
common law clearer in nature than statutes or written constitutions, 
because they were not plagued with the linguistic difficulties that 
result from the attempt to interpret particular terms.123  
Nevertheless, all law, including both written and unwritten, could 
succumb to “the unavoidable imperfections of language by which 
[it] must be promulgated.”124   
Finally, Hopkinson responded to the normative objections 
that critics had levied against the common law by insisting that the 
federal government and the several states were not bound to follow 
the common law as the law of England, but rather through their 
own voluntary adoption, as the “law of common sense.”  As he 
explained, making reference to the earlier argument that the 
common law could preserve the liberties of English subjects, even 
in America, “[t]he advocates of the Common Law, in the United 
States, do not pretend that it can claim any authority here, from the 
country whence we immediately derive it.  It is not because it is 
English law that we would have it received and obeyed, but 
because it is the law of reason and justice. . . .  Our ancestors 
brought it with them; not as a badge of dependence and slavery, 
but as an invaluable right . . . .”125 
Five years later, Brackenridge’s Law Miscellanies—which 
he had initially intended to dub The Pennsylvania Blackstone126—
resumed some of the same themes, providing similar responses to 
                                                                                                             
the two countries,’ if we retain so much of it as is useful and applicable to our 
state of society; and I see no difficulty in this.  The writer, I have alluded to, 
himself asserts, that the Common Law will ‘gradually be lost here.’  Then surely 
if it must be lost, this is the best way of losing it.”).  
122 Id. at 56-57.  This argument is somewhat similar to that which Madison made 
with reference to the intricacies of the common law and the difficulty of 
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critics of the common law.  Aimed at instructing both students and 
lawyers, Law Miscellanies compiled English decisions connected 
with or differing from points in Blackstone’s Commentaries as 
well as variations in the common law specific to Pennsylvania.127  
As the impetus for his labors, Brackenridge cited the necessity for 
a Blackstone edition specific to each state, writing:  
Tucker has given an edition, in which he has taken a view 
of the outline of the constitution and government of the 
United States which has taken place of that of England; and 
at the same time of the constitution of Virginia, and the 
laws under it.  Might not the same thing be necessary as to 
the constitution and laws of each state in the union; 
shewing what principles of the common law have been 
introduced as applicable to our situation; what statutes, or 
constructions of statutes; or, in what particulars, the 
common law has been changed by our acts of Assembly; or 
by decisions of our courts?128  
According to Brackenridge’s view, divergences not only 
characterized the respective common laws of England and America 
but also that of the various states.  These variations were not, 
however, Brackenridge agreed, inimical to the common law’s 
continuation. 
Instead, discussing Sir Matthew Hale’s Observations 
Touching the Amendment or Alteration of Laws as well as other 
sources, Brackenridge argued for the mutability of the common 
law, and insisted that courts should not rigidly apply principles of 
stare decisis in adjudication.129  Rather, “adaptation must have had 
a beginning, and this could only be in the breaking off from 
precedent.”130  Citing a number of English cases, Brackenridge 
observed that “judges will test a decision by the reason if it, and 
overrule what has been ruled before.”131  Hence, he concluded, 
judges in America should not adhere so rigidly to stare decisis and 
thereby “pay[] more deference to English decisions than the most 
technical of the English judges themselves.”132  At the same time, 
Brackenridge criticized those who—like contemporary members of 
Congress and others—supported an 1810 law requiring that judges 
refrain from citing foreign precedents, or, in other words, British 
decisions issued subsequent to July 4, 1776.133  Explaining that 
Pennsylvania judges could look to such cases not as binding 
authority but rather providing persuasive reasoning, Brackenridge 
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131 Id. at 60. 
132 Id. at 64. 
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maintained that, “so far as the common law or statute law of 
England remained common to both countries, decisions on the 
same law remained equally guides to both.”134  As Hopkinson had 
previously, Brackenridge defended a flexible and ecumenical view 
of the common law, according to which it was both susceptible of 
alteration and diversely implemented in the various states. 
 
 
III THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW AS THE THEORY OF THE 
COMMON LAW  
 
 For the Founding generation, the source of law’s legitimacy 
was not simply understood to be its democratic derivation.  Rather, 
debates within the colonial context about what characteristics 
endowed law with binding authority or with a compulsory quality 
raised several alternative hypotheses about the sources of legal 
obligation.  Three, in particular, stood foremost among these: 
contractarian or compact-based accounts of the relationship 
between the colonial subjects and their British colonizers; 
theoretical writings establishing the legitimacy of the English 
common law itself; and conceptions of rights grounded in natural 
law.  These visions were exemplified respectively by three pre-
constitutional sources: colonial charters were often identified as 
compacts binding the colonists to certain principles in exchange 
for a grant of either textually specified privileges or the rights 
conferred by the ancient constitution more generally;135 the 
common law and the ancient constitution associated with it were 
thought to provide a set of liberties and institutions that had 
become binding through acceptance over time;136 and the 
Declaration of Independence insisted vociferously upon the natural 
rights of the colonists.137  The three conceptions of legal legitimacy 
                                                 
134 Id. at 50.   
135 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 
2, at 52 (“The Americans’ own experience with colonial charters indicated a 
mechanism for eradicating the ambiguity and the instability of the larger British 
system.  The example of the contract recommended itself, as the Americans had 
long relied on their own colonial charters as equivalents to written 
constitutions.”).  
136 See JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LIBERTY 34 (2005) (“[T]he issue is why the authority of law 
to command obedience could be established by appealing to the past.  It is not 
quite accurate to say that English law, ‘being customary, relied for authority on 
the presumption of its own continuity.’  It was not continuity but consent that 
vested authority, and the legal doctrine dominating seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century customary law was not presumption but prescription.”). 
137 See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE 87 (1997); Thomas G. West, The Political Theory of the 
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were not, however, simply opposed, but combined in a variety of 
permutations.  Natural and common law rights had for some time 
been intertwined in the English context.  Even in Calvin’s Case, 
Sir Edward Coke invoked the common law and natural law in 
equal measure to establish the principle of subjecthood or 
citizenship by birth.138  Likewise, compact-based accounts of 
obligation, following in the tradition established by Thomas 
Hobbes, often included escape clauses for the articulation of 
natural rights, principally the right of resistance or revolution. 
Finally, some theorized that the privileges ensured by the common 
law to English subjects had been transferred to the colonists 
precisely through the operations of the social compact.139   
 The theory of obligation produced by English thinkers of 
the common law, from Sir Edward Coke through Blackstone 
himself, had emphasized historicity as the source of the authority 
of the common law.  This insistence on historicity bears some 
resemblance to originalism’s own project, although originalists 
purport to examine the meaning of the Constitution in light of the 
Framing because such an approach respects the democratic origins 
of the document rather than because a history of acceptance itself 
creates legitimacy.  At the same time, these theorists insisted that, 
despite deriving its force from history, the common law was also 
pre-eminently susceptible to change.  Each espoused a somewhat 
different notion of how the common law opened itself to alteration, 
and presented a metaphor for its dynamic operations encapsulating 
his particular vision.  At the same time, all consistently invoked the 
Janus-faced quality of the common law, pointing backwards to an 
immemorial past and forward towards a mutable future.  It is this 
flexibility in the common law inheritance—of which the Founding 
generation was aware—that originalism neglects with its insistence 
on a unitary substance of common law, fixed forever at the 
moment of constitutional ratification.  This Part aims, therefore, to 
describe the range of accounts of change within the common law 
that was accessible to the Founding generation and suggest that 
what Scalia designates the post-realist vision of the common law 
was already familiar to earlier thinkers within the common law 
tradition, dating back at least to the seventeenth century.  Not only 
Dworkin, but Coke as well, were aware of the mutability of 
common law.  To achieve a thoroughgoing originalism, it is thus 
necesary to acknowledge that the flexibility of the common law 
                                                                                                             
Declaration of Independence, in  THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND THE SOCIAL 
COMPACT 95 (Ronald J. Pestritto and Thomas G. West eds., 2003). 
138 See Sir Edward Coke, Calvin’s Case, in I SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR 
EDWARD COKE 166, 174 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (“That ligeance, or 
obedience of the subject to the Sovereign, is due by the Law of nature: 2. That 
this Law of nature is part of the Laws of England.”). 
139 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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method was not unknown to the Founding generation and instead 
provided the backdrop for the U.S. Constitution itself.   
 Not only Blackstone’s Commentaries but also Coke’s 
Reports and Hale’s History of the Common Law were texts 
frequently found in eighteenth-century American law libraries.  
According to one measurement, the History of the Common Law, 
first published posthumously in 1713, was the fourth most 
frequently used commentary, after Blackstone, Wood’s Institutes 
of the Laws of England, and Saint-Germain’s Doctor and 
Student.140  Figures like Thomas Jefferson and St. George Tucker, 
creator of the Virginia version of Blackstone, owned copies of the 
work.141  Nor did this text go unmentioned in the writings of the 
Framers.  James Wilson’s Lectures on Law from 1790-91 relied 
heavily—and, in parts, nearly verbatim—on Hale’s History.142  
The two most important debts the Lectures owed the History 
consisted in their vision of change—adopting Hale’s analogy 
between the common law and the Ship of the Argonauts—and their 
understanding of the grounds for the authority of the common law, 
derived not solely from its immemoriality, but instead from the 
popular acceptation of its precepts.143  The entries on legal study in 
                                                 
140 HERBERT A. JOHNSON, IMPORTED EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LAW TREATISES IN 
AMERICAN LIBRARIES, 1700-1799 (1978), 59 (listing Blackstone’s 
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the Common Law as available in 6). 
141 Id. at 27-28 (listing the libraries in which various editions of Hale’s treatise 
could be found).   
142 JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in I WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (James 
DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896). 
143 Wilson’s language is extremely close to Hale’s at various points, and his use 
of the analogy of the Ship of the Argonauts substantially reinforces the evidence 
that Wilson’s remarks derived from Hale’s History of the Common Law.  Hale 
appears to have conflated the Ship of the Argonauts with that of Theseus, hence 
his work is the first and one of the few places where the former appears.  See 
infra notes 181-185 and accompanying text.  
For the resemblance between the two authors’ descriptions of change in 
the common law, compare WILSON, supra note 142, at 425 (“[I]t is extremely 
difficult . . . to trace the common law of England to the era of its 
commencement, or to the several springs, from which it has originally flowed.  
For this difficulty or impossibility, several reasons may be assigned.  One may 
be drawn from the very nature of a system of common law.  As it is 
accommodated to the situation and circumstances of the people, by whom it is 
appointed; and as that situation and those circumstances insensibly change; so, 
especially in a long series of time, a proportioned variation of the laws 
insensibly takes place; and it is often impossible to ascertain the precise period, 
when the change began, or to mark the different steps of its progress.”); id. at 
453-54 (“It is the characteristic of a system of common law that it be 
accommodated to the circumstances, the exigencies, and the conveniences of the 
people, by whom it is appointed.  Now, as these circumstances and exigencies, 
and conveniencies insensibly change; a proportioned change, in time and in 
degree, must take place in the accommodated system.  But though the system 
suffer these partial and successive alterations, yet it continues materially and 
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substantially the same.  The ship of the Argonauts became not another vessel, 
though almost every part of her materials had been altered during the course of 
her voyage.”); id. at 457 (“In the natural body diseases will happen; but a due 
temperament and a sound constitution will, by degrees, work out those 
adventitious and accidental diseases, and will restor the body to its just state and 
situation.  So it is in the body politic, whose constitution is animated and 
invigorated by the common law.  When, through the errors, or distempers, or 
iniquities of men or times, the peace of the nation, or the right order of 
government have received interruption; the common law has wrought out those 
errors, distempers, and iniquities; and has reinstated the nation in its natural and 
peaceful state and temperament.”) with SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF 
THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 39-40 (Charles M. Gray ed., 1971) (“[H]ence 
arises the Difficulty, and indeed Moral Impossibility, of giving any satisfactory 
or so much as probable Conjecture, touching the Original of the [common] 
Laws, for the following Reasons, viz. First, From the Nature of Laws themselves 
in general, which being to be accommodated to the Conditions, Exigencies, and 
Conveniencies of the People, for or by whom they are appointed, as those 
Exigencies and Conveniencies do insensibly grow upon the People, so many 
Times there grows insensibly a Variation of Laws, especially in a long Tract of 
Time . . . .  So that Use and Custom, and Judicial Decisions and Resolutions, and 
Acts of Parliament, tho’ not now extant, might introduce some New Laws, and 
alter some Old, which we now take to be the very Common Law itself, tho’ the 
Times and precise Periods of such Alterations are not explicitely or clearly 
known: But tho’ those particular Variations and Accessions have happened in 
the Laws, yet they being only partial and successive, we may with just Reason 
say, They are the same English Laws now, that they were 600 Years since in the 
general.  As the Argonauts Ship was the same when it returned home, as it was 
when it went out, tho’ in that long Voyage it had successive Amendments, and 
scarce came back with any of its former Materials . . . .”); id. at 30 (“Insomuch, 
that even as in the natural Body the due Temperament and Constitution does by 
Degrees work out those accidental Diseases which sometimes happen, and do 
reduce the Body to its just State and Constitution; so when at any Time through 
the Errors, Distempers or Iniquities of Men or Times, the Peace of the Kingdom, 
and right Order of Government, have received Interruption, the Common Law 
has wasted and wrought out those Distempers, and reduced the Kingdom to its 
just State and Temperament, as our present (and former) Times can easily 
witness.”).   
For the relation between their accounts of the authority of the common 
law, compare WILSON, supra, at 426 (“If this investigation is difficult, there is 
one consolation, that it is not of essential importance.  For at whatever will the 
laws of England were introduced, from whatever, person or country they were 
derived; their obligatory force arises not from any consideration of that kind, but 
from their free and voluntary reception in the kingdom.”); id. at 445 (“In every 
period of [the common law’s] existence, we find imprinted on it the most 
distinct and legible characters of a customary law—a law produced, extended, 
translated, adopted, and moulded by practice and consent.”) with HALE, supra, 
at 43-44 (“[W]henever the Laws of England, or the several Capita thereof 
began, or from whence or whomsoever derived, or what Laws of other Countries 
contributed to the Matter of our Laws; yet most certainly their Obligation arises 
not from their Matter, but from their Admission and Reception, and 
Authorization in this Kingdom; and those Laws, if convenient and useful for the 
Kingdom, were never the worse, tho’ they were desumed and taken from the 
Laws of other Countries, so as they had their Stamp of Obligation and Authority 
from the Reception and Approbation of this Kingdom by Virtue of the Common 
Law . . . .”).   
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John Adams’ diary also attest to the influence that Hale’s History 
had upon him, although they are accompanied by Adams’ self-
excoriations for lack of studiousness.144  Brackenridge likewise 
cited Hale’s Observations Touching the Amendment of Laws in 
Law Miscellanies.145   
 Coke’s Institutes and Reports were also widely 
disseminated and endorsed during the Founding Period.  Jefferson 
included Coke’s Institutes in his 1814 list of books for law students 
as the first work to be studied, and praised Coke at Blackstone’s 
expense, writing that “Coke’s Institutes and reports are the first, 
and Blackstone their last work, after an intermediate course of two 
or three years.  It is nothing more than an elegant digest of what 
they will have acquired from the real fountains of the law.”146  
Adams also referred extensively to Coke throughout his writings.
 The accounts that Coke, Hale, and Blackstone provided of 
the history of the common law underlay their theories about the 
sources of its authority and its identity, including its capacity for 
various forms of change.  Whereas Blackstone emphasized a 
legislative supremacy according to which statutory enactments 
would and should supercede the common law, the early thinkers 
possessed a more nuanced notion of the relationship between 
written and unwritten law.  They also, and even more centrally, 
insisted on a vision of the common law as at the same time 
retaining a coherent identity through time and yet as flexible and 
susceptible to change.   
 In his classic study The Ancient Constitution and the 
Feudal Law, J.G.A. Pocock elaborated the fundamental paradox 
inherent in the common law vision of custom in the early years of 
the seventeenth century; legal thinkers of this period, particularly 
Coke, valued custom because it was “immemorial”, or rather, 
spanned back before the time of the Norman Conquest of 1066, but 
at the same time because it was open to alteration.147  Assertions of 
the immemoriality of common law drew upon a nativist strand of 
thought that wished to “turn inward . . . upon the past of its own 
nation which it saw as making its own laws, untouched by foreign 
influences, in a process without a beginning” as well as a desire 
not to ground the common law in prior legislation but instead 
“make a case for an ‘ancient constitution’ against the king.”148  The 
concept of the “ancient constitution” thus served the political 
purpose of restraining the extensive power—allegedly grounded in 
                                                 
144 JOHN ADAMS, Diary, in II WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 100-1, 103 (1850).  
145  
146 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Bernard Moore, IX WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 480, 482 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898); Letter to Judge Tyler, 
supra note 73; see also Waterman, supra note 43, at 460-62. 
147 POCOCK, supra note 82, at 36. 
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divine right—claimed by King James I.149  At the same time, 
common lawyers exalted custom as embodying the results of 
judicial efforts to improve the law over a long period of time, 
resulting in what Coke dubbed the common law’s “artificial 
perfection of reason.”150 Pocock suggests that the conceptions of 
custom as at once flexible but also immemorial can be reconciled 
by appealing to the basic ambiguity of common lawyers’ vision of 
custom.151  
 Whereas Pocock takes Coke as the paradigmatic example 
of a “deep-seated and unconscious habit[] of mind,” maintaining 
that “[i]t is hard to believe that the common-law interpretation of 
history was consciously and polemically constructed,”152 
chronological analysis of the prefaces to Coke’s Reports, where he 
articulated his own account of the history of the common law, 
suggests otherwise.  Indeed, even Coke may maintain a closer 
affiliation with what Scalia deems post-realist visions of the 
common law than has been generally acknowledged.  In one of the 
earlier prefaces, Coke first disparaged the work of non-legally-
trained historians, such as the annalists, in order to present his own, 
alternative history of the common law and a genealogy for English 
law that reaches back to ancient Greece.153  Seeming to forget this 
previous self-justification once he had fully articulated his own 
account, Coke, in a subsequent preface, attempted to claim that 
other historians generally agreed with it.154  Coke also went to 
great lengths to explain to the reader, whom he explicitly 
addressed at various points, why his own Reports were necessary 
despite the immemoriality of the common law, an effort that 
illuminates his understanding of how change occurs within the 
tradition. 
 Given the immemoriality that Coke posited for the common 
law, one might imagine that his Reports would be rendered 
superfluous by the availability of other records of decisions under 
the common law.  In the preface “To the Reader” to Part Three of 
the Reports, Coke explained that similar reports had been 
composed before, and he even enumerated pre-existing sources.155  
                                                 
149 See JAMES I, The Divine Right of Monarchies, in JAMES VI AND I: POLITICAL 
WRITINGS (Johann P. Sommerville ed.). 
150 POCOCK, supra note 82, at 35. 
151 Id. at 36-37. 
152 Id. at 42. 
153 COKE, supra note 138, at 59, 59-78. 
154 Id. at 245 (answering yes to the question of “whether Historiographers do 
concurre with that [history] which there [in his prior Reports] hathe been 
affirmed”). 
155 Id. at 59 (“How profitable and necessarie the Reports of the Judgements and 
Cases in Law published in former ages have beene, may unto the learned Reader 
by these two considerations amongst others evidently appeare.  First, that the 
Kings of this Realme, that is to say, Edward the third, Henry the fourth . . . and 
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As a result of this wealth of materials, Coke imagined that “it may 
seeme both unnecessary and unprofitable to have any more 
Reports of the Law,” especially because, “about the end of the 
raigne of Henry the 7. it was though by the Sages of the Law, that 
at that time the Reports of the Law were sufficient.”156  Coke 
defended his project of reporting against this criticism by insisting 
that the same reasons that underlay the earlier reports also make 
his own activity essential.  Statutory innovation may have altered 
the state of the law since the earlier period, and, even if such 
change did not take place, uncertainty and conflicts may arise out 
of previous reports.157   
 This situation demands an effort by the reader—and by 
Coke himself—to generate a coherent account of the common law 
based on a “better understanding of the true sense and reason of the 
Judgements and resolutions formerly reported” or upon resolving 
“such doubts as therein remain undecided.”158  Coke thus described 
his own Reports as being “but in the nature of Commentaries.”159  
Although he urged that legal readers not “wrest[] or rack[], or [by] 
inference of wit . . . draw [his own Reports] . . . from their proper 
and naturall sense,” Coke’s own practice in certain instance 
demonstrates a looser approach to prior cases, one that appears 
self-consciously to revise their import.  As Plucknett has 
demonstrated with respect to Bonham’s Case, often taken to 
provide the first justification for judicial review, Coke significantly 
added to the language of the cases he cited to bolster his 
conclusion that “the common law doth control acts of Parliament, 
and sometimes shall adjudge them to be void,” thereby 
                                                                                                             
Henry the seventh did select and appoint foure discreet and learned professors of 
Law, to report the judgements and opinions of the Reverend Judges, as well for 
resolving of such doubts and questions wherein there was (as in all other Arts 
and Sciences there often fall out) diversitie of opinions, as also for the true and 
genuine sense and construction of such Statutes and Actes of Parliament, as 
were from time to time made and enacted.”); 60 (speaking of “the judiciall 
records of the Kings Courts”); 61 (enumerating “the auncient bookes of the 
Common Lawes yet extant,” including Glanvill, Bracton, and Britton) 
156 Id. at 72. 
157 Id. at 72-73.  These comments might seem to weigh the effect of statutes 
heavily, but Coke largely viewed Parliamentary enactments as innovating in less 
than desirable ways and as being, in general, eventually superceded by a return 
to the pre-existing common law:  “Out of all these Bookes and Reports of the 
Common Law, I have observed, that albeit sometimes by actes of Parliament, 
and sometime by invention and wit of man, some points of the auncient 
Common Law have been altered or diverted from his due course; yet in 
revolution of time, the same (as a most skilfull and faithfull supporter of the 
common wealth) have bin with great applause for avoiding of many 
inconveniences restored againe . . . .”  Id. at 73.   
158 Id. at 72-73 
159 Id. at 72. 
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substantially altering the meaning of the quoted passages.160 In 
reconciling doubts, Coke did not retain absolute fidelity to earlier 
sources but instead provided innovative and transformative 
readings of these precedents.  
 At the same time as he renewed the understanding of the 
common law extracted from earlier cases, Coke insisted to the 
reader on the paramount value of examining prior reports and other 
books of common law.161  What is at stake in this position appears 
to be the very identity of the common law itself.  In response to the 
question of “what the body or text of the common law is”162—an 
equation between body and text that, in its formulation, might 
already seem to dictate part of the answer—he explained that the 
common law consisted in the early statutes, such as Magna Carta, 
which “for the most part are but declarations of the common law,” 
in addition to “the original writs contained in the Register 
concerning common pleas, and the exact & true forms of 
Inditements & Judgements thereupon in criminall causes . . . .”163  
Under this view, the Yearbooks and reports of cases constitute 
commentaries upon the common law rather than the object of study 
itself.164   Yet their status as commentaries did not render such 
texts any less significant; on the contrary, Coke continually urged 
his readers to read and reread these materials.165   
 Through the third, sixth, and eighth prefaces, Coke created 
an early canon of sources for understanding the common law, 
providing a litany of particular works and describing where they 
were to be found.  These materials derived from “record” he 
contrasted with those of “storie”, the previously conventional 
register of the historian.166  In particular, Coke extolled the use of 
cases as precedent and example.  For Coke, citing precedent 
assisted in the task of persuading the reader of the validity of the 
propositions that a case put forth.  As Coke wrote in the third 
preface:  
[M]ine advise is, that whensoever a man is enforced to 
yeeld a reason of his opinion or judgement, that then hee 
set downe all authorities, presidents, reasons, arguments, 
                                                 
160 Plucknett, Bonham’s Case and Judicial Review. 
161 COKE, supra note 138, at 103 (“The reading of the severall Reports & records 
of these Lawes, doth not only yeeld immence profit, as elsewhere I have noted; 
but doth conteine the faithfull and true Histories of all successive times”); id. at 
72 (stating as the aim of his own reports the idea that they “will be a meane (for 
so I intended them) to cause the studious to peruse and peruse againe with 
greater diligence, those former excellent and most fruitfull Reports”). 
162 Id. at 245. 
163 Id.  
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165 See supra note 161. 
166 COKE, supra note 138, at 245. 
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and inferences whatsoever that may bee probably applied to 
the case in question; For some will be perswaded, or 
drawne by one, and some by another, according as the 
capacitie or understanding of the hearer or reader is.167    
In the sixth preface, Coke provided even more explicit instruction 
about citation practices.  Responding to a religious individual’s 
criticism of Caudries Case, Coke explained that the case simply 
repeated established law, and that he, unlike his devout 
interlocutor, “quoted the Year, the Leaf, the Chapter and other 
certain References for the ready finding [of the “Judgments and 
Resolutions of the Reverend Judges and Sages of the Common 
Laws”].”168  According to Coke, cases also furnish informative 
examples of particular legal principles.  In describing this function, 
Coke foreshadowed the case method of instruction: “The reporting 
of particular Cases or Examples is the most perspicuous course of 
teaching, the right rule and reason of the law; for so did Almighty 
God himself, when he delivered by Moses his Judicial Laws, 
Exemplis docuit pro Legibus . . . .”169  Far from dispensing with 
previous reports, Coke instead viewed them as providing valuable 
instantiations of the principles of common law and undergirding 
the authority of his own decisions.  One of the goals of his reports, 
therefore, was to furnish “a mean (for so I intended them) to cause 
the studious to peruse and peruse againe with greater diligence, 
those former excellent and most fruitfull reports.”170  
 According to Coke’s understanding, reliance on precedents 
furnished a certain kind of authority, yet prior case reports 
themselves might not provide satisfactory reasons for particular 
outcomes and might even seem to dictate disparate results. 
Because of this situation, reading, re-reading, and interpretation 
become essential.  Examining precedents thereby assists the lawyer 
or judge in contemplating and evaluating particular legal problems, 
but does not necessarily provide the answer to a specific question; 
it is in this way that Coke reconciled the immemoriality of the 
common law with the simultaneous assertion of the need for his 
own reports.   
 Later in the seventeenth century, following the legal and 
political disruptions occasioned by the English Revolution, Sir 
Matthew Hale expressed an even more explicit vision of the 
common law’s susceptibility to change.  A figure of continuity 
within the rapid transitions from royal to parliamentary regime and 
back again, Hale had presided over an Interregnum law reform 
commission and had been appointed to a judicial office during the 
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period that he managed to retain upon the Restoration of Charles II 
to the throne.171  In this respect, he resembled the bureaucratic 
personnel of contemporary transitional governments, retained by 
new regimes that wish to benefit from their acquired expertise and 
establish stability.172 
 The effects of the temporal moment are evident in Hale’s 
posthumously published History of the Common Law.  The illusion 
of an immemoriality that bespoke permanence upon which Coke 
and his contemporaries could insist no longer represented a 
plausible fiction.  Thus Hale viewed the Norman Conquest not, 
like Coke, as a point to be elided, but rather in light of other 
moments of colonization or revolution, including alterations in the 
forms of sovereignty within England and the country’s efforts to 
export its laws to Ireland and elsewhere overseas.  To be sure, Hale 
suggested at one point that any resemblances between Norman and 
English law may have traveled not in the direction of conquest but 
rather back to Normandy from England,173 and posited that 
William I did not conquer the English people as a whole, but only 
won a contest with the King over title to the crown, and hence did 
not have the power to alter the common law.174  Nevertheless, Hale 
generally wrote not, like Coke, of the indigenous purity of the 
common law, but rather of its hybridity.  
 In his History, Hale elaborated the fundamentally 
multicultural formation of the common law and the consequent 
impossibility of definitively tracing a single origin: “hence grew 
those several Denominations of the Saxon, Merician, and Danish 
Laws, out of which . . . [Edward] the Confessor extracted his Body 
of the Common Law, and therefore among all those various 
Ingredients and Mixtures of Laws, it is almost an impossible Piece 
of Chymistry to reduce every Caput Legis to its true Original, as to 
say, This is a Piece of the Danish, this of the Norman, or this of the 
Saxon or British Law.”175  In addressing both this varied state of 
the law prior to the Norman Conquest, and the effects of the 
conquest itself, Hale insisted that the continued acceptance rather 
than the origin of the common law was essential in endowing it 
with authority.  Thus “the Strength and Obligation, and the formal 
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Nature of a Law, is not upon Account that the Danes, or the 
Saxons, or the Normans, brought it in with them, but they became 
Laws, and binding in this Kingdom, by Virtue only of their being 
received and approved here.”176  Likewise, even if the Norman 
Conquest had resulted in the introduction of foreign laws into 
England, “their obligatory Power, and their formal Nature or 
Reason of becoming Laws here, were not at all due to those 
Countries, whose Laws they were, but to the proper and intrinsical 
Authority of this Kingdom by which they were received as, or 
enacted into, Laws: And therefore, as no Law that is Foreign, binds 
here in England, till it be received and authoritatively engrafted 
into the Law of England.”177  The authority of law, for Hale, thus 
results not from the source of its origin but rather from its 
acceptance into and engrafting onto domestic law. 
 This release from grounding the authority of the common 
law in its immemoriality enabled Hale to explicitly acknowledge 
legal change and to write the first account of the common law that 
openly presented itself as a history and spoke of the common law’s 
extraordinary capacity to accommodate itself to particular 
emergencies.178 He simultaneously, however, emphasized the 
identity of the common law over time.  Reconciling these two 
positions led Hale to elaborate a more detailed theory than Coke of 
the ontology of law, one expressed largely in the form of 
metaphors. 
 Profoundly influenced by seventeenth-century scientific 
thought, and himself an author of several such treatises—the sole 
works he published during his lifetime—Hale expressed his views 
of the nature of the common law in terms that were both somewhat 
neo-Epicurean and indebted to his rival, Thomas Hobbes.  Hale 
and Hobbes disagreed in several respects about the grounds for 
law.  In describing how the common law could be envisioned as 
retaining unity in the face of alteration, Hale implicitly responded 
to various examples Hobbes had mustered when discussing the 
basis for identity.  For Hale, 
Use and Custom, and Judicial Decisions and Resolutions, 
and Acts of Parliament, tho’ not now extant, might 
introduce some New laws, and alter some Old, which we 
now take to be the very Common law itself, tho’ the Times 
and precise Periods of such Alterations are not explicitely 
or clearly known: But tho’ those particular Variations and 
Accessions have happened in the Laws, yet they being only 
partial and successive, we may with just Reason say, They 
are the same English Laws now, that they were 600 Years 
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since in the general.  As the Argonauts Ship was the same 
when it returned home, as it was when it went out, tho’ in 
that long Voyage it had successive Amendments, and 
scarce came back with any of its former Materials; and as 
Titius is the same Man he was 40 Years since, tho’ 
Physicians tells us, That in a Tract of seven Years, the 
Body has scarce any of the same Material Substance it had 
before.179     
Both the comparison with the Ship of the Argonauts and with the 
mutability of man’s body derive from the first part of Hobbes’ 
1655 Elements of Philosophy, although Hale inexplicably 
substituted the Ship of the Argonauts for that of Theseus, the 
classical topos that Hobbes himself had followed.180 
 The analogies appear in Hobbes’s work in the context of 
the philosopher’s attempt to establish the grounds for identity.  
Hobbes explained the conventional methods for individuating 
entities as relying on form, matter, or accident.  Those maintaining 
that identity consisted in form would insist that, “when a Man is 
grown from an Infant to be an Old Man, though his Matter be 
changed, yet he is still the same Numerical Man,” or that “that 
Ship of Theseus (concerning the Difference whereof, made by 
continual reparation, in taking out the old Planks, and putting in 
new, the Sophisters of Athens were wont to dispute) were, after all 
the Planks were changed, the same Numerical Ship it was at the 
beginning.”181  Hobbes’ objection to this group of thinkers was that 
they would have to acknowledge a ship compiled from all the 
discarded planks of Theseus’ ship into the same form as the 
original ship as identical to the other, gradually transformed Ship 
of Theseus.  On the other hand, he criticized those who believed 
that identity subsisted solely in matter by insisting on the 
impracticability of this view:  “He that sins, and he that is punished 
should not be the same Man, by reason of the perpetual flux and 
change of Mans Body; nor should the City which makes Lawes in 
one Age, and abrogates them in another, be the same City; which 
were to confound all Civil Rights.”182 
 A better way to discern identity and difference is, Hobbes 
claimed, to consider the scope of the name for which sameness is 
asserted—whether that of man or body—and assign as the 
meaning for the name “such Form as is the beginning of 
Motion.”183  This would result in designating a man with reference 
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to his birth, or a city with reference to its initial “institution.”184  
Hobbes’ fiction of the social contract thus provides the underlying 
unity for the political order he treated in the Leviathan.  In 
criticizing this vision—which he reduced to a thorough-going 
nominalism—Thomas Tenison urged instead, through the dialogic 
persona of a student of divinity, that identity cannot derive simply 
from physical motion but must connect with an underlying soul.185  
 By contrast, Hale disassociated identity from origin and 
instead connected it with the perception of the common law’s 
continuity despite change, and with the polity’s acceptance of a 
body of common law—and various alterations to it—as law.  The 
common law thus served, for Hale, as “the Completion and 
Constitution of the English Commonwealth,” a constitution that 
could smooth over any political disruptions, including that of the 
English Revolution.186  Whether a particular transformation was 
effected through judicial decision or statute seemed to make little 
difference for Hale;187 the only relevant point to be established 
consisted in whether the change was accepted as part of the 
common law.  Hale’s History of the Common Law thereby reveals 
his theory of the common law as one through which identity is 
created by reception and within which changes should be accepted 
that can be integrated into the overarching fabric of the law.   
 Although relying on history as a source for the common 
law’s authority, Coke and Hale both provided accounts of its 
mutability that were influential for the Founding generation.  
Whereas Coke demonstrated the ways in which judicial 
interpretation of prior cases could both focus attention on the 
questions raised by those precedents and generate new solutions, 
Hale elucidated how the common law could retain a singular 
designation despite accommodating the emergencies of the times.  
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Taken together, these views suggest an alternative to envisioning 
the late eighteenth-century common law as an immutable set of 
rules. 
 As the next Part shows, this historically enriched account of 
early American understandings of the nature and practice of the 
common law suggests as well an alternative to fixing 
contemporary originalist interpretive practice on a static, selective, 
and oddly reified snapshot of eighteenth-century English common 
law.   
 
  
IV A COMMON LAW ORIGINALISM 
 
The options for originalists are not, I would contend, quite 
as stark as Justice Scalia imagines.  Accepting the cross-cutting 
strands of the common law as part of an originalist perspective 
would permit an originalism attentive to the questions raised by the 
common law and its mode of reasoning rather than one fixated 
upon particular, decontextualized answers.  The disparities within 
eighteenth-century common law—between that of Blackstone and 
the colonies, and even within the colonies themselves—help to 
tease out the kinds of arguments that were waged over the common 
law, and point backwards and forwards to common law principles 
that had in the past been or would in the future become dominant.  
Attention to the emergence of common law rules out of these 
debates leads to an understanding of particular constitutional 
clauses as interventions within a contested common law backdrop, 
interventions that were informed by contemporaneous arguments 
but not necessarily determined by a majority position.188 
Furthermore, the availability to the Founding generation of 
a vision of the common law strikingly similar to a post-realist 
account suggests the possibility that, rather than attempting to 
conjure up answers to the questions posed by disparate eighteenth-
century versions of the common law within a past-oriented 
framework, jurists should take up the challenge of responding to 
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these questions from the vantage point of today.  Common law 
judges of earlier eras themselves reinterpreted received precedents 
with an eye toward their own situations; this approach should also 
characterize our approach to the common law components of the 
Constitution. 
Living constitutionalists might then ask why originalism 
should be retained at all.  The answer, I believe, is provided by the 
story of the common law itself, which succeeded in retaining 
relevance over a number of centuries despite its adaptation.  Rather 
than disregarding its own history, as dispensing with originalism 
entirely might do in the constitutional arena, the common law 
method instead considers historical materials and adopts a critical 
stance towards them.  It is precisely this attitude that would inform 
a common law originalism.   
The method of common law originalism would, thus, 
involve posing a sequence of questions to the judge:  Do common 
law conceptions inform a constitutional term or phrase?  If so, how 
did disparate strands of the common law concern the legal 
principle in question?  What kinds of questions emerge out of the 
different common law visions presented?  How might one answer 
these questions from the standpoint of the present without 
exceeding the frame provided by the questions posed?  One 
entailment of this method is that it would take substantial research 
and analysis to answer the sequence of questions for even one 
particular term or phrase; the aspiration of the remainder of this 
Part is, thus, not to furnish such answers but to sketch the approach 
that a common law originalist would take.   
Adjudication under the Seventh Amendment provides 
several examples of the ways in which common law originalism 
would lead to reasoning different from both that of living 
constitutionalists and Scalia-type originalists.  The Seventh 
Amendment explicitly refers to preserving a particular part of the 
common law:  “In suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to 
the rules of the common law.”189  Because the Seventh 
Amendment represents a constitutional anomaly in that it actually 
refers to the common law, it might seem inapposite as an example 
of the application of common law originalism.  At the same time, 
however, Seventh Amendment cases furnish a valuable resource 
for assessing the range of possible approaches to the incorporation 
of the common law into the constitution, because justices from 
Brennan and Marshall to Kennedy and Scalia generally concur 
that, in the Seventh Amendment context, if in no other, history is 
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relevant to constitutional adjudication.190  Furthermore, most of the 
justices examine primarily the British rather than American 
contexts.  Where they diverge is simply in their view of how 
eighteenth-century common law should be deployed. 
The Seventh Amendment’s background itself also suggests 
the salience of a common law originalist approach.  When the 
subject of the right to a jury trial in civil cases—one of the 
principal concerns of the Seventh Amendment—arose late in the 
Constitutional Convention, several delegates objected to 
incorporating any reference to the civil jury on grounds similar to 
those articulated by James Wilson when the question came up 
during the Pennsylvania ratification process:  “The want of 
uniformity would have rendered any reference to the practice of 
the states idle and useless: and it could not, with any propriety, be 
said, that ‘the trial by jury shall be as heretofore:’ since there has 
never existed any federal system of jurisprudence, to which the 
declaration could relate.”191  Although these concerns were put 
aside sufficiently to allow ratification of the Seventh Amendment 
itself, they demonstrate the unsettled nature of the constitutional 
text’s common law backdrop. 
Three principal issues to which a common law originalist 
perspective might prove valuable arise in interpreting the Seventh 
Amendment. First, the Seventh Amendment’s invocation of “fact” 
has required the Supreme Court to opine about what constitutes 
fact or law. Second, the Re-examination Clause, specifying that 
“no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law,” raises questions about the status of a trial court’s or 
appellate tribunal’s review of jury determinations at common law.  
Third, the jury trial guarantee for “suits at common law” generates 
                                                 
190 See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 449-69 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (arguing for fidelity 
to the original meaning of the Reexamination Clause); Chauffeurs, Teamsters 
and Helpers, Local No. 391, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) (Marshall, J.) (explaining 
that, in Seventh Amendment cases, to determine whether the jury trial guarantee 
applies, the court first “compare[s] the statutory action to 18th-century actions 
brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and 
equity” and then second “examine[s] the remedy sought and determine[s] 
whether it is legal or equitable in nature”); Id. at 584 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) 
(placing priority on comparing the contemporary cause of action at issue with 
those of the eighteenth century in deciding whether it is more legal or equitable 
in nature); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155 (1973) (arguing that “by 
referring to the ‘common law,’ the Framers of the Seventh Amendment were 
concerned with preserving the right of trial by jury in civil cases where it existed 
at common law, rather than the various incidents of trial by jury”).   
191 3 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 101 (1911); see also  
2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 587 (1911); 
Colgroved, 413 U.S. at 156. 
 48 
controversy about the relative scope of common law and equity 
and how that should be determined. 
The distinction between fact and law has been invoked 
sporadically by the Supreme Court in both the context of the initial 
right to a jury trial in civil cases and in that of review of jury 
verdicts.  In assessing the extent to which a particular claim arising 
within a case should be decided by a jury rather than a judge, the 
Court has often explained that it “depend[s] on whether the jury 
must shoulder this responsibility as necessary to preserve the 
‘substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.’”192  One way 
in which the Court has determined this question is by referring to a 
“line . . . between issues of fact and law.”193  Hence, in City of 
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, explained that, under the Seventh Amendment analysis, 
predominantly factual issues should be allocated to the jury.194  
The relevance of the distinction between fact and law becomes 
even more prominent in the Re-Examination Clause context, as 
that Clause refers specifically to a “fact tried by a jury.”  In this 
setting, the Court has held that punitive damage awards can be 
reviewed because they do not constitute facts tried to a jury.195  In 
describing the relationship between fact and law, however, these 
cases refrain from examining the common law conception of what 
constituted fact as opposed to law.  The common law originalist’s 
first intervention into this area would, thus, be to inquire about that 
relation and establish the eighteenth-century views about what 
constituted a determination of fact.  This kind of inquiry is 
currently neglected not only by living constitutionalists but also by 
conventional originalists; although the latter insist upon the 
relevance of particular rules from the Founding era in 
constitutional interpretation, they largely leave aside the 
jurisprudential underpinnings of common law terms and phrases 
within the Constitution.  
Turning to the Re-Examination Clause, the common law 
originalist might insist on a more restrictive reading than a living 
constitutionalist would endorse.  The common law and common 
lawyers eschewed appeal and opponents of the Constitution 
invoked with horror the possibility that federal appellate courts 
might overturn jury determinations of fact.196 The question of 
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whether appellate tribunals can reduce jury awards consistently 
with the Seventh Amendment’s Re-Examination Clause has arisen 
on a number of occasions.197  The weight of Founding era 
arguments against appeal would affect the common law 
originalist’s decision about whether courts could reduce jury 
awards on appeal, or the extent to which they would be empowered 
to do so, whereas it might not influence that of the living 
constitutionalist.    
 On the other hand, however, the common law originalist 
would also inquire more than the Scalia-type originalist about the 
balance between courts of equity and those of common law in the 
colonies and early states as well as under the British system.  She 
would then ask whether the seventeenth- or eighteenth-century 
English visions of the relationship between Chancery and common 
law held more sway at the time of the Founding.  From these 
inquiries, she would determine the range of beliefs about the 
appropriate balance between common law and equity at the time of 
the Founding.  This might affect the contours of the right of trial by 
jury to be “preserved” by the Seventh Amendment.  It would also 
lead to a more flexible than formulaic attempt to achieve the 
balance in the contemporary moment.  
 Currently, the Court applies a two-part test to assess 
whether a particular cause of action fits within the Seventh 
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee; it first looks to whether a 
contemporary cause of action possesses eighteenth-century 
analogues, and whether those analogues are legal or equitable, then 
examines the type of relief available, and assesses whether it is 
legal or equitable in nature.198  The Court’s cases appear 
increasingly to place priority upon the latter rather than the former 
inquiry.199  In evaluating this approach, the common law originalist 
would first ask how the distinction between common law and 
equity was conceived in the Founding era, and the extent to which 
the common law was considered to comprise a set of forms of 
action or a particular catalogue of remedies.  She would then, 
within the broad framework of the distinction between common 
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law and equity that emerged, allow room for the dynamic growth 
that, as Justice Ginsburg has noted, always characterized equity.200  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
   
Originalists’ emphasis upon William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England tends to suggest that the 
common law of the Founding era consisted in a set of determinate 
rules that can be mined for the purposes of constitutional 
interpretation.  This Article has argued instead that disparate 
strands of the common law, some emanating from the colonies and 
others from England, some more archaic and others more 
innovative, co-existed at the time of the Founding.  Furthermore, 
jurists and politicians of the Founding generation were not 
unaware that the common law constituted a disunified field; 
indeed, the jurisprudence of the common law suggested a 
conception of its identity as much more flexible and susceptible to 
change than originalists posit.    
The alternative that this Article proposes—“common law 
originalism”—treats the strands of eighteenth-century common law 
not as providing determinate answers that fix the meaning of 
particular constitutional clauses but instead as supplying the terms 
of a debate about certain concepts, framing questions for judges 
but refusing to settle them definitively.  It likewise suggests that 
the interpretation of common law phrases should be responsive to 
certain alterations in external conditions, rather than static and 
inflexible.  Situated between living constitutionalism and 
originalism as currently practiced, common law originalism 
attempts to square fidelity to the Founding era with fidelity to its 
common law jurisprudence—a jurisprudence that retained 
continuity yet emphasized flexibility and was inclusive enough to 
hold disparate legal conceptions in its embrace.   
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